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FUTILITY OF DEPENDING ON AMERICA STRESSED

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 7 Apr 80 p 1

[Editorial: "The Failure Summit"]

[Text] The coming Washington talks, regardless of whether they are on a bilateral or trilateral level, will be doomed to failure, and the people who know this result the best are the participants themselves. Let us not be concerned with laying blame for the failure on anyone. The child which came into the world as a result of the difficult birth at Camp David was buried by Menachem in Jerusalem, after he dealt successive derogatory slaps in the face of American mediation.

The Washington meetings are no more than a hopeless attempt to resurrect this child, who died before he saw the light of day. He had his short life only because of artificial medical equipment which maintained his blood flow but did not revive his consciousness.

The mistake, the whole mistake, is basically in accepting American mediation and relying on America's good intentions, which do not exist now, and never did. The Americans, since they became a world power after World II, have pursued a single political line, based on supporting Israel and suppressing the rights of the Palestinian people. They are doing this consciously and intentionally, satisfied that it is to their imperialistic advantage to follow this line.

This historical fact has continued without interruption over the past 30 years. No modification, substitution or change has occurred. There is nothing on the Arab or international horizon to indicate that the Americans will drop or modify this line. We kept building castles in the air and fantasizing that each new American President will not be like his predecessor. But the castles always collapsed and the fantasies were always blown away.

Did we not pin hopes on Nixon? Did we not hail his dispatch of Governor Scranton to the area on a fact-finding mission? And did not Scranton recommend an even-handed policy? But what was the result? Material and military support for Israel during Nixon's presidency exceeded that of all previous presidencies put together.

There are still those among us who hope that Carter, in his second term, will take measures to cut Israel down to size, arouse it from its dreams and shake off its arrogance. We state beforehand that we must not rely on this lad, and we must not pursue a new mirage. Neither Carter, nor the Republican cowboy, nor any other president, intends to take any action which will upset Israel or hurt its sensitive feelings.

We wonder: Why should we wait for America to take a step which irritates Israel? Would it do it to gain Arab favor when such favor is already there, whether Israel or the Arabs receive a slap in the face?

The issue is clear: America will never change its wrong ways unless we deal it a painful blow. We are capable of this. The important thing, however, is not to lack the will to do it.

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CSO: 4802

SUCCESS OF NEW CARTER-SADAT-BEGIN TALKS SEEN DOUBTFUL

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 1 Apr 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Attempts To Divide the Issue"]

[Text] It is clear that attempts to divide the Palestinian issue, for the purpose of continuing fruitless efforts to bring about peace in the region, cannot be successful, unless the basic Palestinian role in any peaceful solution is taken into consideration.

In spite of the informational halo, the letters attached [to the Camp David accord] pertaining to the future of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem, and efforts to mislead the world that the region is entering an era of peace and stability, the administrative autonomy talks have helped wash away the glitter of Camp David, following the failure of the principals to agree on even the superficial issues. All they did so far was to form the Egyptian-Israeli sub-committees. But they then froze the work of these committees and are now content with preparing for the coming meetings between American President Carter and each of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

Israel's concept of autonomy is among the things which complicate matters, since Israel claims that it covers the residents, but not the land or the water sources. This leads people here to view these ideas with scorn, and to consider them no more than theories coming from persons who are not serious about finding a basic solution for the Palestinian issue.

In the face of this deadlock, and in order to get out of the vicious circle of Byzantine debate between Egypt and Israel over the autonomy, attention is now shifting to the coming days of this month, when President Carter will meet with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in Washington in a new attempt to end this standstill.

We doubt that this attempt will succeed. Consequently, the autonomy talks are doomed to failure unless the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are assured.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

IRAN-IRAQ RIFT SEEN HURTING PALESTINIAN CAUSE

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 6 Apr 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Iraq-Iran Relations"]

[Text] No one can deny the gains realized by the Palestinian cause thanks to the Islamic revolution in Iran, which has persisted in supporting the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own destiny and to establish their independent state on their national territory, ever since the leaders of the Iranian revolution changed Iran from a nation hostile to the aspirations and security of the Palestinian people to supporters of the Palestinians. The Iranian leaders have eliminated the negative repercussions from which the Arab world suffered during the reign of the former shah, as they have been able to return their country to its original Islamic role.

It is regrettable that relations between revolutionary Iran and certain Arab nations, among them Iraq, should deteriorate, because the current tension attending Iran-Iraq relations can never serve the Arab and Islamic cause which Iraq is anxious to serve.

As we declare our agony over these events, we all hope that the commendable efforts which certain parties are exerting at this time will find backing and encouragement from both sides to clear the air of all causes of disruption and discord and stop this bleeding which can never be beneficial to the Arabs in general, and the Palestinian cause in particular.

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'AL-SAFIR' ON ALLEGED EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA RECONCILIATION

NC101125 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 9 Jun 80 pp 1, 12

[Text] The Saudi Government denied yesterday that any direct or indirect meetings or contacts had been held with Egyptian officials on any level. In the meantime, AL-SAFIR has received an exclusive report from Cairo confirming these contacts and pointing out that the Egyptian-Saudi relations have made good progress toward repairing the bridges on all levels.

Quoting the official SAUDI PRESS AGENCY, REUTERS says that Information Minister Muhammad 'Abduh Yamani has declared that the reports by some news agencies and papers that Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat has visited the kingdom or that he intends to visit it are fabricated and baseless.

He added: "There has been no change in the firm Saudi policy which is not formulated in the dark or in secret."

The report received by AL-SAFIR refers in detail to the following information: The officials here in Cairo act as though matters between Cairo and Riyadh are returning to normal. They do not conceal their confidence that the question has become "one of time, no more and no less. We are not in a hurry."

Political observers have definite information "that many shuttle to and fro in visits to al-Sadat and Prince Fahd" and that correspondence between them has made good progress in clarifying the positions, thus narrowing the gap between the Egyptian and Saudi regimes.

More than one meeting between Egyptian and Saudi officials has been held in European capitals. Al-Sadat's Deputy Husni Mubarak has publicly declared that he has met with such and such a prince and that "Kamal Adham's line" continues to function efficiently.

A few months ago, al-Sadat had actually sent his Information Minister, Mansur Hasan, the rising star in the sky of his regime, to Riyadh with a private letter for Prince Fahd. It is recalled that Mansur Hasan--who until the eve of the recent cabinet reshuffle was a candidate for a basic role in

al-Sadat's regime (prime minister, for example) [parentheses as published]-- has close ties with Saudi Arabia and the Saudis including relationship affinity through his wife.

Al-Sadat has actually received a reply which was conveyed to him by special envoy a few weeks ago.

Less than a month ago, al-Sadat sent another messenger (believed to be his son-in-law and adviser Engineer Sayyid Mar'i) [parenthesis as published] with a new letter containing more explanations and clarifications on the "nature of the relationship" between Cairo and Washington and al-Sadat's understanding "of Carter's election campaign," and why the Arabs should help him if they actually want U.S. assistance that would be instrumental in solving "the Middle East crisis."

Informed sources here say that the simplest pointer to the nature of the relationship between Cairo and Riyadh are al-Sadat's speeches and his statements.

These sources recall that al-Sadat had previously stopped his campaign against the ruling Saudi Kingdom, to be precise, when Mansur bin Fasan was sent [to Riyadh]. However, when the Saudis were late in answering him, he intensified the campaign. The Saudis sent him the required reply and he finally stopped the campaign.

These sources add that matters have passed the stage of "preparation" and entered what can be described as the stage of "rebuilding what has been demolished," including the economic and social aspects of the relations. Prince Fahd's recent statements were the result of this development in the relations and were not a mere "jump in the known" or a mere "open letter to Carter and Begin," appealing to them to introduce some slight changes to the declared position on the Palestinian question in order to facilitate a meeting afterwards.

According to a senior Egyptian official, Prince Fahd's statements can only be understood in the light of several considerations and developments in the area and mainly:

1. The establishment of something similar to "an Eastern Alliance" among Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan on the basis "of the need to confront the Iranian revolution and its aspirations outside its borders.
2. The steady efforts which this axis exerted to draw the PLO to it by hinting that a draft solution would replace the Camp David and which could be realized through the so-called "European initiative."
3. The fading out of the relations between the parties to this axis and Syria, and the sharp divergence in their political stands which so far has assumed the character of defamation by hints while avoiding a direct open war.

4. The efforts which the parties to this axis have exerted and are exerting to polarize the other Arab states under various themes. The most prominent theme in the past months was that of the Soviet interference in Afghanistan. These states include, for example, Northern Yemen, where matters escalated to the extent of threatening to overthrow the regime, Oman, Somalia and the Sudan, which appears to be getting away from al-Sadat without in any way disturbing U.S. policy in the region.

5. King Husayn's active moves and his new-old decision to visit Washington --which he hitherto has avoided on the pretext of its evidently clear stand as manifest in the Camp David agreements.

This senior Egyptian official draws attention to the following very significant matters:

1. The development of the Saudi attitude toward al-Sadat and consequently toward the Camp David has taken place under the canopy of "a concentrated U.S. artillery shelling" represented in the wide scale information campaign which the U.S. information media in particular, and the Western media in general, waged against the Saudi family. The most significant campaign was the film "The Death of a Princess."

2. These developments coincided with the continuous talk about a government crisis in Israel, or which the simplest result would be the removal from power of Menahem Begin and the preparation for the return of the Labor Party which is now ready to give more to the Arabs of the Orient than Begin gave to the Arabs of Egypt and (Morocco) [parenthesis as published], to get them out of the battle.

Some of those close to al-Sadat give endless details on the nature of al-Sadat's dealing with the question of change in Israel. Examples of this dealing can be given and precisely some of what the Egyptian president circulated among "his brother Arab kings and presidents," particularly to convince the rulers of Saudi Arabia that "there will be a solution of the Palestinian question no matter how long it takes and how stubborn Begin may be" provided they have patience as he himself is patient.

The examples include:

"Ezer Weizman told al-Sadat more than once within the hearing of his aides: Your Excellency the President, all the Israeli historical leaders--Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir--have died and there is no one left for us. God has been kind to the Israeli people and provided you to lead us to peace."

Following this emotional prelude which is most pleasing to al-Sadat, Weizman, naturally, goes on to say: "Therefore, Your Excellency the President, hope is pinned on you to save the people of Israel, even from the mistakes of Begin. It won't be really a big thing if you gave this stubborn old man what he asks for at this or that point. What is important are the results."

Those close to al-Sadat add that Weizman has "entered the heart of al-Sadat" and has become very familiar with him. The following incident is among other things said about the relationship between the two men.

At one of their friendly meetings, Weizman expressed to al-Sadat his desire to permit him to spend the rest of his life (after he retires) (parenthesis as published) in Alexandria. Weizman was surprised by the Egyptian president's reply who immediately told him: Alexandria is yours but I will not let you retire and will appoint you, if you retire, as my advisor on aviation affairs.

On the basis of the dimensions of the special relationship between al-Sadat and Weizman on the one hand and between al-Sadat and the Israeli Labor Party group on the other, diplomatic observers here consider that the Egyptian president has sold Begin's skin to the Arab rulers before the hunt. He might have impressed on them that he has a U.S. guarantee in this regard, in order that their return to him may be justified and relatively acceptable to Arab public opinion, particularly if Carter's term of office at the White House is renewed, as is expected.

These observers add: Weizman's resignation has positively given al-Sadat's talk that ring of truth which they [the Arab rulers] have been seeking before coming to him with their abundant billions of dollars; in particular if the desired "amendments" give King Husayn a share in "the solution" which would strengthen his position as a substitute for the PLO after the collapse of the autonomy plan according to the Camp David formula for the occupied West Bank.

As for Syria, everybody here agrees that it will be the direct target if this encirclement plan succeeds. To reach Damascus, it is necessary to achieve two things: dealing more blows to the Palestinian resistance and keeping the Lebanese wound open. This is what is being done feverishly now.

The observers conclude by saying: It is in the light of this that al-Sadat's announcement yesterday that he was prepared to go to Riyadh can be understood. Al-Sadat knows who and what awaits him in Riyadh.

The story has other chapters. The movement is fast and everybody is in a hurry because "time is treacherous." Open your eyes to what is happening in Lebanon because it provides the features of what will happen.

CSO: 4802

'AL-SAFIR' INTERVIEWS FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER ABU JIHAD

NC052121 Voice of Palestine (Clandestine) in Arabic to the Arab World 1635
GMT 5 Jun 80

[Interview with Brother Abu Jihad, member of the Fatah Central Committee and deputy commander in chief by Beirut newspaper AL-SAFIR on 5 June 80]

[Excerpts] QUESTION: What link is there between the deportation of Fakh al-Qawasmih [mayor of Hebron], Muhammad Milhim [mayor of Halhul] and Shaykh Rajab al-Tamini [Moslem Qadi of Hebron] and the assassination attempt on the three mayors of Nabulus, Ramallah and al-Birah?

ANSWER: It is clear that the revolutionary action against the occupation has recently assumed a developed form and has begun to escalate. This was manifested in the Hebron operation, which had an effect on the military government and the Israeli enemy authorities. Israel carried out a series of measures and drew up a plan to confront our revolutionary action.

These measures are part of the political decisions which the enemy authorities have adopted in the cabinet or in the Knesset foreign affairs and security committee. The chairman of this committee said that they have decided on a number of measures which would end the Palestinian uprising inside the occupied territories. The action taken against the mayors of Hebron and Halhul and the Qadi of Hebron was one of these measures.

However, they saw that all these measures have not weakened the popular resistance or lessened the determination of the people. Therefore, they turned to the liquidation of the leaders in the occupied territory. We had advance information about these measures, and that the Zionist enemy will seek to liquidate many national leaders inside the occupied territory as well as functionaries and other elements whose murder could cause confusion and tribal problems to complicate matters. We are expecting more of these measures to liquidate the national leaders. Therefore, we have warned our brothers inside the occupied areas and are still warning them through the information media and radio. We spoke about the security measures which most of these leaders must take to frustrate our enemy's plan.

From the political point of view, the Zionist enemy thinks that by attacking a number of strugglers or by liquidating a number of national leaders he can affect the morale of the masses and extinguish the fire of the revolution and its expansion. However, facts have always given the answer immediately. The deportation of al-Qawasimah, Milhim and Shaykh al-Tamini did not dampen the situation. On the contrary, it inflamed the situation all over the occupied homeland. The attack on Karim and Bassan and their injury and on Ibrahim al-Tawil and his escape led to a new uprising and a new psychological tremor.

This means that if the Zionist enemy thinks that by these methods he can end the spirit of enthusiasm, he is mistaken. The answer was given by our people in the occupied territory. They have affirmed their determination to resist and defy this enemy.

QUESTION: Some Israeli officials say that those who planned this action are Israeli extremist organizations. This is an attempt to exonerate the Israeli government.

ANSWER: We have known this method by the Zionist enemy since before 1948 when the Dayr Yasin massacre was carried out by Begin and his groups. No one believes that when Gush Emunin embarks on a settlement operation it does so with the knowledge and approval of Begin and his government. Therefore, regardless of who carried out this assassination attempt, we think that it is a decision taken in the Knesset foreign affairs and security committee when they considered how to confront the popular uprising. The decision was also taken with the knowledge and planning of the Israeli chief of staff. The operations were sophisticated. Only experts within the army are familiar with them.

QUESTION: Let us move on to the Fourth Fatah Congress. We would like to hear from you a general assessment of the work and results of the congress.

ANSWER: Nine years have passed since the Third Fatah Congress was held. Throughout these 9 years we have been trying to choose a specific time to hold the fourth congress. But the developments of events, wars and battles which our revolution faced made it difficult to hold this congress, and therefore it was postponed for this long period. When this congress convened after these 9 years, it had to evaluate this past period and draw the lessons from it in order to draw up the guidelines for the future of the struggle in our movement and revolution. On the first day of the congress there was an emotional reunion of more than 530 Fatah representatives from no less than 70 countries, including directors and envoys of the revolution bureaus in no less than 45 countries. This is in addition to representatives of the fighting forces, militia, military departments and all the revolution departments. A large number of representatives met after a difficult period and successive events. They met for the first time after 9 years. It was natural that there should be differences in the understanding of developments and in analysis and evaluation. But through brotherly

discussion and dialogue characterized by democracy it was possible to reach a common understanding. The manifestation of democracy in the congress expressed the strength of this movement and not its weakness. It expressed the desire of everyone to emerge from the discussions with something that could promote the movement on the path of struggle with greater strength and determination.

QUESTION: Did the congress take decisions that tackle internal organizational problems?

ANSWER: On the level of rules and regulations, there have been some gaps in the past years in our rules and regulations. Furthermore, the developments of the past 9 years dictated the need to absorb the new results, including expansion of the departments of the revolution and the movement. Thus, many of the organizational forms and rules and regulations became inconsistent with the new reality of the movement. Therefore, the congress studied all the rules and regulations and was able to draw up an internal code and a number of organizational rules and regulations which govern the movement.

QUESTION: What is your assessment of the political results of the congress?

ANSWER: On the political level, there were specific political aims and principles which governed our movement throughout the past years. However, there have been new developments in the political arena which had to be tackled. Therefore, through long dialogues and debates of all political actions, through the meetings of committees and their long discussion and through the views expressed by all those who spoke at the congress, the Fourth Fatah Congress came out with the political program, which was approved. The program dealt with the strategic aims of the revolution with regard to comprehensive liberation, the democratic Palestinian state and the escalation of armed struggle as a principal method for achieving these aims. The program also defined out position toward many issues, including the issue of a settlement, the issue of the Camp David plot and the issue of the current Arab inaction. The resolutions announced in the program drew up a picture of the spirit of struggle and reinforced the steps of political action, which is governed by controls that allow broad political movement all over the world to achieve the aim of acquainting people with our rights and increasing contacts with the widest possible circle of international institutions and conferences to win greater recognition and support for our national rights and our revolutionary struggle. This political program constitutes a strengthening and support for Fatah's struggle line, which expresses the aspirations of our Palestinian masses.

QUESTION: Isn't this program considered a return to Fatah's previous intransigent policy?

ANSWER: It is not a question of flexibility in a certain period and then a return to inflexibility. We have always maintained revolutionary firmness.

If there was a certain flexibility, it never for a moment deviated from the nature of the aim and from serving the strategic objective which we have drawn for ourselves.

QUESTION: With regard to the paragraph on Jordan, don't you expect that it will disturb the current negotiations between the PLO and the Amman government?

ANSWER: We are convinced of what we have written in our program. The opinion was emphasized in the congress that we must struggle to make Jordan one of the bases for Palestinian revolutionary struggle. This struggle has many aspects. It is a political and revolutionary struggle.

QUESTION: How did the issue of Lebanon figure in the congress? Was special attention given to Lebanon, the south and the suffering Lebanese citizens?

ANSWER: Of course. Lebanon figured as one of the principal arenas for the work of the Palestinian revolution.

Much attention was given in the congress to the issues of southern Lebanon. The congress noted that the inhabitants of southern Lebanon have given much to defend the Palestinian revolution and that their sacrifices have been historic and unforgettable.

Therefore, discussion at the congress dealt with the methods which the revolution can use to strengthen its relationship with the Lebanese people, especially in southern Lebanon. Attention was given to the need for the revolution to take some practical measures to ease the sufferings of our brothers in the south to provide stronger conditions and relations that can withstand events.

CSO: 4802

POLITICAL-MILITARY MEANING OF HEBRON INCIDENT EXPLAINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 10 May 80 pp 30-31

[Article by Nabil Khalifah: "The Rebellious Bank; What Is the Political and Military Significance of 'the Two-Minute Operation in Hebron'?"]

[Text] "The West Bank is an embodiment of the Palestine question. As such, it is the focal point in the arena of struggle in the Middle East. Even if the Israelis and the Americans--even the Egyptians--tried to wish it away, they will find it impossible to do so because the two questions are intertwined. Therein lies the secret of the real predicament of the Camp David accords. Israel, which has thus far established its military control over the West Bank and the [Gaza] Strip, was unable to impose its control over the popular will in both areas. The real battle which will determine the success or failure of the accords is the battle for controlling the popular will there."

This passage was part of a study published in AL-MUSTAQBAL (issue No 90, 11 November 1978) about the Camp David accords under the title of, "The West Bank in the 25th Hour." History has now demonstrated that the West Bank is in the 25th hour indeed--the hour of the tragic alternative. This alternative will destroy all others because it is the quintessential alternative.

This article will examine the status of the West Bank from three perspectives:

- 1--What are in brief the reasons which make Israel cling to its control of the West Bank?
- 2--What are the real meanings of "the two-minute operation" in Hebron?
- 3--What are the likely political and military ramifications of that operation?

Apropos Point 1: Israel and the West Bank

Israel adheres to the "principle" of controlling the West Bank for a host of religio-historical, social, military-security and political-economic reasons and rationalizations. These can be summed up as follows:

A) The religious-historical-Biblical claim: In the Jewish concept, the West Bank is Judea and Samaria. It is not only part of Israel, but, as Moshe Dayan has put it, it is "the heart of Israel." Since the Biblical ideology is the determinant of Menachem Begin's political strategy--indeed, Begin's political ideology is well-nigh the shadow or equivalent of his Biblical vision--one can understand the claim of "historical" relationship between the Jewish people and "their indisputable right to settle in all the lands of Israel, including Judea and Samaria," as Begin has once stated.

B) The social aspect: The practical application of that right is settlement, because "Israel cannot secure a position of strength in the West Bank except through settlement." And since "the act of settlement is the essence of Zionism" and since Israel invokes "the rights of the Jewish people to the West Bank," Israel has proclaimed the "legitimacy" of the establishment of settlements in the West Bank and the right of Jews to settle there--that is, to settle wherever they wish to live.

C) The military-security aspect: To quote Ezer Weizman, "Israel will not abandon Judea and Samaria at any time, even if peace were achieved, for security considerations that are related to insuring the continued existence of Israel." In the view of military experts who are closely associated with Israel, enemy armor in the mountains of "Samaria" can divide Israel into two in a matter of minutes. Therefore, there is no significance to any outside security guarantees and safeguards when there is a force which can confound all the Israeli lines of communication thereby denying Israel one of its most important advantages in war.

D) The political-economic aspect: There is a consensus among the Israeli political institutions that the West Bank should be retained because of its political importance as trump card in any peace negotiations with the Arabs (Jordan especially), on the one hand, and as an agricultural area which can constitute a good fence between Israel and its neighbors, on the other.

Apropos Point 2: The "Real" Meanings of "the Two-Minute Operation" in Hebron

The military operation carried out by Arabs in Hebron on the evening of Friday, 2 May, lasted two minutes only. Historically, however, it compresses decades of Arab-Israeli conflict. It is a link in the chain of retaliation and counter-retaliation which Hebron has been and remains one of its more volatile points. The list of retaliations has been growing since the 1920's and through the 1980's. The most dangerous aspect of that chain of retaliations and counter-retaliations is that they are a mixed bag and of a complex nature where individual retaliation (on the part of the relatives of the victims) overlaps with collective retaliation (between Arabs and Jews) and where the two are intertwined with nationalistic retaliation (between Arab nationalism and Zionism), as well as with existential-survivalist retaliation (between the right of residence and the right of settlement) and finally with existential-metaphysical retaliation (between Islam and Judaism about the right to worship in the same place). All these types of

retaliation combined explain the "quality" and "essence" of the interaction between the two groups. In other words, they explain the unequalled radicalism and ferocity which typify positions of defiance and counter-defiance. The meaning of the conflict in Hebron can be summed up by Shakespeare's famous line: "To be, or not to be: That is the question."

Nevertheless, those "retaliations" would not have erupted with the violence and severity with which they have been marked recently had it not been for an important factor which concerns us: To reach the closed horizon. [sic] Until now, the Israeli policy has been dealing with the inhabitants of the West Bank on two frequencies: The frequency of containing the West Bank through dialogue, in accordance with Ezer Weizman's theory, and the frequency of containing the West Bank through challenge, in accordance with the theory of Menachem Begin and his extremist arm, the Gush Emonim.

Even after the signing of the Camp David accords, the inhabitants of the West Bank still entertained a feeling, even a hope, that the future will carry some kind of independence, even if within certain parameters which would insure a minimum of the Arab-Islamic values and lift a part of the hegemony of Israeli presence--at least, the psychological military presence. However, the unfolding of the autonomy talks confirmed to the most optimistic Arabs in the West Bank that there is no hope, that the question of containment is a fait accompli, even though styles may differ, and that their very survival as well as their moral and religious survival are at stake.

And so, the entire situation in the West Bank was transformed in only two minutes. The latent and repressed sentiments awakened all at once, bringing forth the real, historical face of the West Bank and posing the Israeli forces before the possibility of a popular revolution--something which has not happened in the West Bank since its occupation in 1967.

The dangerous aspect of the "two-minute operation" to Israel is that it springs from and responds to the depth of feelings and sentiments among the inhabitants of the West Bank and that it amounts to something like a declaration of war by an unarmed people--a people that lack weapons but are armed with their right to existence, life, values and faith. Therefore, it seems that the operation was not "planned" or "contemplated and studied" in places far removed from the center of struggle. Those kinds of operations, regardless of whatever military or struggle connotations they carry, are invariably associated with political and ideological calculations, tactics and circumstances which may not always be an expression of the popular state of being, while spontaneous reactions are always closer to being an expression of that popular state of being. This is how one should understand the statement made by the Israeli defense minister Ezer Weizman that "the battle of Hebron places Israel face to face with the battle of its destiny." This is because that battle went beyond being a "factional" action within the West Bank and acquired the quality of being an expression of a general situation. In other words, it went beyond being a war of positions and viewpoints and became a war of survival in which each party asserts its "right" to existence and survival.

Apropos Point 3: The Likely Repercussions of the Operation

There is an identity in the views of the world press commentators that the Hebron operation is the most dangerous operation witnessed by the occupied territories in 13 years. The two-minute operation torpedoed the policy of coexistence between Arabs and Jews chiefly engineered by Moshe Dayan. After what has happened in Hebron, it has become necessary to re-examine everything--methods, potentialities, capabilities, probabilities and even the fundamentals. The repercussions of that operation can in the short and long terms thus be perceived within the following possibilities:

A) Judaization of the West Bank through the double process of emptying and settling [Arab lands]. There are many indicators that this is a likely situation. There has long been disagreement between some Israeli cabinet ministers about the question of how to deal with the inhabitants of the West Bank and about the "boundaries" of settlement. Perhaps settlement in Hebron itself provides a clear picture of the real and basic aims of the extremists in power. Last March, the government adopted a decision permitting settlement in Hebron, but voted in favor of a stay of implementation of that decision because of the opposition of some ministers. But the extremists found it a propitious opportunity to create an explosive situation in the West Bank. In so doing, they were trying to take advantage of six things:

1--To push things toward a bloody clash with the Arabs to place the moderates in a tight corner and to hand over the reins to the hawks of expansion and settlement.

2--To harden the Israeli position on the question of autonomy.

3--To prevent autonomy from taking place, even within the narrow limits which Begin has agreed to, on the grounds that autonomy might become a stepping stone towards some kind of independence under the pressure of the influential powers, especially the United States.

4--To speed up the policy of settlement in the most sensitive areas, such as Hebron.

5--To regroup the various political forces around Begin, that is the forces which have begun to detach themselves from Begin when he reached a state of deadlock. For he cannot press on with the settlements in view of the pressure of world public opinion and the condemnations of the Security Council, and at the same time he cannot back down from an issue which is one of the goals and cores of his political career. Exploding the situation would be a way out of this fix for Begin.

6--To take advantage of the fact that the United States is going through a difficult and critical time--internally (the elections) and externally (Afghanistan and Iran)--and is not, therefore, in a position to exert pressure on the Israeli authority if it were to undertake limited or medium range or large-scale military adventures.

B) To give the autonomy negotiations a new direction "in the light" of what took place in Hebron, and on the eve of 26 May, in order to "persuade" the Egyptians and Americans about the Israeli argument concerning "the security of Israel." This means taking a harder position on the question of "the right of Israel to maintain security in the West Bank" in any agreement that may be reached by Israel, Egypt and the United States on this issue. This will temporarily lead to suspension of the negotiations pending new arrangements and perhaps new attitudes and positions by the two parties.

C) To stiffen the Israeli military position in the West Bank and the Gaza Sector by increasing the powers of the military command, turning the army, in Sharon's words, into "an iron hand" and diversifying the methods of pressure and persecution against the inhabitants of the West Bank--methods such as deporting new personalities, denying the municipalities and other institutions permission to receive money from abroad, closing the bridges on the river Jordan, closing down schools and universities, destroying houses and suppressing public and private freedoms. In a word, turning the Bank into a large prison.

In this very dangerous game which the Israeli extremists are playing, the deep struggle between a regime that has power but does not have authority and a people who have authority but do not have power becomes quite evident. In this clash between power and authority a lot of blood will be shed and harrowing tragedies will occur. This is what awaits the two parties in the chain of internecine violence which we have seen only its first links.

When Gen Ariel Sharon, the hawkish champion of settlement in the West Bank, arrived in Hebron minutes after the two-minute operation, he said: "The Arabs should know that we will remain with them here forever." How? That is the question Sharon has failed to answer thus far. Until that answer is given, the Bank will witness more "minutes." Each minute will have a history.

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CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

UAE PRAISES IRAQI PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT--Baghdad, 4 Jun--Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Hamid al-Qasimi, UAE minister of state for Supreme Council affairs, has asserted that President Saddam Husayn's national declaration enjoys the support of every Arab, be he an official or an ordinary citizen, because the declaration has ascertained the Arab nation's special character. In a statement to INA, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz said that the Arab nation is in dire need of this kind of declaration because it is bound to safeguard the nation's dignity, security and honor. He described Shaykh Saqr's talks with both President Saddam Husayn and RCC Vice Chairman 'Izzat Ibrahim as positive and effective and said that these talks stress the fraternal spirit which binds the Arab Gulf states. Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz said that the Arab nation is now passing through an important historical stage which dictates that the Arab leaders study the formulas which will achieve the prosperity of this nation and the Arab Gulf area and will fend off all coveters. [Text] [JN041057 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1030 GMT 4 Jun 80]

CSO: 4802

PROBLEMS OF ATTEMPT TO SUPERIMPOSE ISLAMIC TEACHINGS ON MODERN ECONOMY

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 28 Apr-4 May 80 pp 38-39

[Article by Al-Amin Ibn 'Umar: "A Crisis in the Islamic Development Bank in Jidda; What Is the Islamic Economic Position on the Question of Interest?"]

[Text] When the Islamic Development Bank in Jidda recently tried to deposit funds in the Saudi Arab Monetary Establishment, a real crisis broke out. As it turned out, the establishment deposits its money in Western banks which work with interest. What are the dimensions of that problem and how can it be solved in the modern age?

Comparative economic studies used to be confined to a comparison between different economic systems. Until recently, those systems were primarily meant to be the Western capitalistic economic system and the Eastern--or rather Marxist Communist--socialist economic system. As is known to all, each system has its own social and political philosophy or ideology on life and society.

Today, however, a new element has entered the world of economics as a result of the growing Arab Islamic tide represented by the political awakening that comes at the dawn of the 15th Hejira century. The winds of change are accompanied by attempts to create a third economic "system," other than the two that we have mentioned. There are today those who advocate a change in the scientific view of the capitalist and socialist systems, that is by considering the two as one "materialistic" system, since both of them lack moral and spiritual considerations in their trade, financial or monetary dealings. As an alternative, those people call for a new "Islamic" economic system that does not separate between the material and the spiritual, but attaches great importance to the spiritual in dealing with the material aspects. God says: Thou should seek the hereafter in anything that God has given you.

This is a new idea in our present age, but it is in fact as old as Islam. It is an idea that does not separate between the world, life, income and economy, on the one hand, and religion, the spirit and moral codes--that is piety and the fear of God--in personal and collective dealings in life, on the other.

There are also those who now speak of the economic teachings that Islam has brought forth as an independent system which has its own assumptions, equations and scientific conclusions which derive from Islam and which formulate a complete economic theory on production and its factors, consumption and its patterns, investment and its principles, money and its substitutes and markets of all kinds, including cycles of growth or recession, etc.

At the other end of the economic spectrum, we find some people who have reservations and who worry that the teachings of Islam and the experience of the state established by the prophet, God bless him and grant him salvation, in which the ideas of the Prophet and some of his followers were implemented, though for a short time, will be hurt by the scores of rash actions resulting from revolutionary calls and by the pitfalls of unstudied, unrehearsed attempts. Those concerned people would like the ultra-religious or revolutionary Islamic elements to curb their theoretical fantasies lest their attempts boomerang and lest the failure of their experimental attempts reflect negatively on the soundness of Islamic principles and teachings in the world of finance and trade. Some of those people pose the following specific question: Does Islam have a scientific economic "theory" or an economic system? In posing the question, they are not being critical inasmuch as they feel sorry for and protective of Islam from the errors and fancies of human beings. Therefore, they see the question as nothing more, thus far, than the fact that there are many principles and teachings (pro or con) in the faith of Islam which bear relation to the world of economy, and perhaps to economic science and theories. Unquestionably, the Koran and the Sunna contain a lot of references to alms, inheritance, ownership, loans, usury, business transactions, wages, labor, taxes, etc. While they concede that Islam is both a religion and a way of life for the individual and the group alike, they believe that the economic transactions which are commonly subsumed under the topic of transactions of "finance" in Islam and which were practiced during the "state of civilization" and the reign of the Companions of the Prophet, were simplistic, and perhaps "primitive"--the the abstract not the derogatory sense of the word--when measured by the criteria of the modern age. That is because the conditions of the modern age are totally removed from those that existed during the "state of civilization" and the reign of the Companions, especially when we consider things like present banking systems (with their loans, investments, and local and international financial, commercial and monetary activities, the various insurance systems, multilateral corporations, stock markets and international and regional financing institutions.

The advocates of that view do not close the door of ijtiḥād--judgement and interpretation--nor do they deny those who are properly qualified the right to ijt'ḥād. Surely, the practitioners of ijtiḥād should possess a suitable scientific plan when they engage in discussing Islamic economics, as some people call it. That is to say that economists in the Arab Islamic countries do not know much about Islamic religious law--the shari'ah--and the Islamic theologians know nothing about economics--which is to say that

Judgement and interpretation which are not backed by the qualification to do so are invalid. Therefore, a lot of people cite the famous statement which the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, made to his followers in connection with improving the quality of [palm] dates. In that statement, he said: You are more knowledgeable about the affairs of your own world. They also cite his other statement in which he advised his followers to search their own hearts when they face a dilemma.

The advocates of this view do not, of course, wish to justify the present indulgence in the purely materialistic economy of the West and the East, inasmuch as they wish to encourage enlightened and qualified judgement and interpretation, which is what the rules of *Ijtihad* in Islam require, based on a full familiarity with and knowledge of modern economics. They want to see the gap bridged between Islamic theologians and modern economists in the interest of joint research and debate, whereby the theologians would understand and absorb the laws and principles of modern economics, and the modern economists would become familiar with the laws of Islam. Only then can debate be fruitful and can *Ijtihad* be effective in trying to institutionalize Islamic teachings on labor, commerce, money and so forth in a manner that would offer solutions to the various problems of lawful or unlawful practices in today's economy and that can be articulated into a "system" based on theoretical principles.

We are reminded of this by the economic-theological controversy which arose when the Jidda-based Islamic Development Bank wanted to deposit money in the Saudi Arab Monetary Establishment which in turn deposits funds in Western banks that practice unlawful usury. The major and puzzling question that emerged during that controversy was: Should the Islamic Bank collect interest on its deposits in Western banks, thereby making unlawful profits, or should it leave the interest for the Western financial circles so that those circles which are often hostile to Arabs and Moslems should make use of the interest sums of money?

A state of dilemma emerged and controversy erupted. We heard that some people suggested that the interest from the Islamic funds deposited in usury-practicing Western banks should be used to help poor Islamic societies. Others said that the interest should be left untouched because it is illegitimate. Still others condemned the principle of depositing funds in Western banks. The question of what to do is still being raised, considering that the amount of interest accruing from those deposits is in the hundreds of millions of dollars. A lot of people are awaiting the solution.

There are other problems of this kind and other kinds. One such problem concerns personal savings in the new Islamic banks in Kuwait, Dubai, Sudan and other countries. Some theoreticians in those banks have advocated a system of giving depositors prizes as incentive instead of paying them interest on their savings, which amounts to usury, as non-Islamic banks do. Several people complained that this solution is virtually usury wrapped in

cellophane, and called on the religious oversight committees which monitor the operations of the Islamic banks to make sure that such ideas or "interpretations" are religiously sound before they are applied to the savings of Moslem depositors (see Dr Rafiq al-Masri in the AL-AMAN magazine).

Another example concerns insurance on the assets and properties of Islamic banks. It is to be remembered that insuring with the usual insurance companies is religiously forbidden. We have learned that Islamic banks were able to get around this problem by establishing their own insurance companies to insure their assets and goods on Islamic bases which permit cooperative insurance that does not permit the taking of people's money by falsehood. The Islamic cooperative insurance system is beneficial in all aspects to those who hold insurance policies. But the problem which has faced Islamic banks once again is that insurance requires underwriting in commercial and economic business. The underwriting has forced those banks to resort to underwriting companies (such as Lloyds and its sisters) on the grounds that necessity justifies violating the prohibitions. This has given rise to controversy and has prompted some people to urge caution because of the seriousness of such operations, especially since a large number of persons dealing in loans involving the prohibited interest plead the same "necessity" as a justification for their actions--so how can one reconcile the two?

These are samples of the nature of new problems which are emerging as natural consequences of the "application" of Islamic teachings in modern economics--or actually of the superimposition of such problems on Islamic teachings in a rash, and perhaps excessive, manner, on the presumption that there exists an Islamic economic "system." In fact, what the situation requires is the proper climate and a gradual approach that go hand in hand with careful, in-depth studies and legitimate and qualified ijtihad.

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CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE SECRETARY TO JORDAN--Islamic conference organization secretary general Habib Chatti, accompanied by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Marwan al-Qasbi, visited Nabulus Mayor Bassam al-Shak'ah, who is in the Husayn Medical Center for treatment, today. Chatti expressed the Islamic conference organization's denunciation of the inhuman and oppressive measures that the Israeli occupation authorities are taking against Arab citizens in the occupied Arab territories. Chatti arrived in Amman from Damascus last night on a visit to Jordan as part of a tour of several Arab countries. [Text] [JN111210 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 11 Jun 80]

CSO: 4802

GROUPS IN EXILE OPERATING AGAINST KARMAL'S REGIME

Paris LE MONDE in French 24 May 80 p 4

[Article by Mike Barry: "Afghanistan Crucified: Part II. Groups in Exile"]

[Text] Mr Karmal's regime, installed by the USSR in Kabul at the end of December 1979, continues to maintain military control over the country with the help of the Soviet army, attempting to crush resistance by fair means or foul. War and bloody repression have caused 750,000 refugees to flee to Pakistan. Support from the border populations and from within the community explain why up to now this major migratory movement has not assumed even more dramatic proportions.

Peshawar--In the border town of Peshawar six political groups are vying for the allegiance of Afghan refugees. On March 21, 1980 five of them banded together: the Jamiat-e Islami, or Islamic Assembly, led by the elderly theologian, Mr Borhanuddin Rabbani; the Harakat-e Engelab-e Islami, or Islamic Revolution Movement, led by the former deputy Mohammad-Nabi Mohammadi; the Jabhah-ye Azadi-e Afghanistan, or Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan, led by the highly respected theologian Sebghatullah Mudjadeddi; the Payman-e Ettihad-e Islami, or Pact of Islamic Union, led by the landowner Sayed Ahmed Gilani; and finally the Herz-e Islami, or Islamic Party, led by the elderly Moslem cleric and tough military commander Mr Mohammad Younus Khales.

These groups provided themselves with a very young Moslem cleric for a secretary general, Gholam Rasoul Sayaf, who was recently liberated from the concentration camp at Pol-e Tcharki and whose name could well take on symbolic value: Servant of the Prophet and Bearer of the Sword. Despite the rhetorical ring of their names, these groups are pro-Western and moderate, advocating a more or less liberal form of Islamic democracy. For example, the theologian Mudjadeddi spent a long time in Denmark. The military commander with a white beard, Younos Khales, a colorful traditional figure, enjoys a reputation for courage won on the battlefield in the

eastern part of his country where he fights alongside his people. The reputation of Mr Gilani, called "Effendi-Djan" or "Your Highness," is less sparkling: the sort of rapacious landowner who could serve all by himself as the living incarnation of the feudal characteristics attributed by the pro-Soviet regime to the entire resistance effort. The new alliance from now on will be called Ettehad-e islami-e azadi-e Afthanistan, the Islamic Alliance for the Freedom of Afghanistan. It is financed in part by the Arab monarchies and by the conservative Pakistani movement Jamiat-e islami, the Islamic Assembly, which helped overthrow Prime Minister Bhutto in 1977.

A Unit Marked by Fundamentalism

However, the most impressive of the Peshawar groups, the Hezb-e islami or Islamic Party led by the young "engineer" Golbudin Hekmatyar--the Flower of the Faith and Friend of Wisdom--has refused to join the Alliance. Rigidly and uncompromisingly fundamentalist, and as anti-Western as it is anti-communist, this appropriately labelled Islamic Party represents the Afghan version of the Moslem Brotherhood; its extremism does not go down well with the moderate Alliance leaders.

Since 1974 it has been firmly ensconced in Pakistan. The movement had already, four years before the pro-Soviet coup, become extensive enough to alarm the Afghan Prince-President Daoud, whose policies were denounced by the Islamic Party as "pro-Soviet." Many activists were arrested and Mr Golbuding Hekmatyar took refuge in Pakistan. In order to frustrate the irredentist policy of former President Daoud who demanded independence for Pakistan's Pashtun provinces, and to have a political card to play, Ali Bhutto granted Mr Hekmatyar asylum. The Islamic Party as well receives funding from Arab countries and, in addition, it seems, from the Pakistani Jamiat-e islami. In spite of its Sunni conservatism, the Islamic Party has established links with Iranian supporters of Ayatollah Khomeyni since the time of his seizure of power; this is prompted by the obvious similarities of their philosophies.

The five-group alliance's influence does not extend much further than 100 km inside the country and even that is due to the military prestige of the elderly commander, Mr Younos Khales, who is fighting in his native region in eastern Afghanistan to cut off the road leading from Kabul to the border. Always at the front line, and opposed to restoring the former royal family to power in any way as well as to Mr Hekmatyar's fundamentalism, Mr Khales is one of the most popular resistance leaders--but his influence remains strictly regional. The Alliance is still a refugee-oriented organization: it recruits its members by distributing money and provisions to them (it has no weapons). The Afghan humanitarian organization of Dr Amanollah Rabboul, which supplies tents from the AICF [expansion unknown] and other organizations, keeps up friendly but distant relations with the Alliance.

The influence of Mr Hekmatyar's Islamic Party would hardly extend any further into the country--he too distributes generous amounts to the refugees--if he did not enjoy the support of numerous sympathizers among rural schoolteachers, civil servants and young officers. These same social categories have also made up the bulk of the members of Afghan communist parties. However, this paradox is only a superficial one.

An Austere Militancy

The Islamic Party's massive yellow building presents a resolutely austere exterior--quite the opposite of the cheerful villa surrounded by a garden and grill-work gate of Mr Mudjaddedi's Front. With a serious look on their faces, the militiamen at the door, covered with Kalashnikov cartridges, habitually frisk Afghan visitors, but journalists who look like Westerners just walk in and out. In the courtyard a throng of Afghan refugees in brown capes is always crowding around.

In very primitive offices, decorated only with illustrated writing from the Koran, photographs of dead rebels, or gloomy portraits of Iranian ayatollahs, very young militants read out war communiques to journalists in an imperious tone of voice and in very basic English: "Our forces have destroyed four Russian tanks and have killed 11 Soviet advisors and 60 Government soldiers in the province of ... etc." A revealing characteristic is that these fellows educated in Kabul, where suits [missing words] from that time on have been wearing the Khaki pajama-like national dress with shawls draped round them and have beards.

At set times these young lieutenants of Mr Hekmatyar's (he rarely shows himself) interrupt the press conferences to ostentatiously join in group prayer in the courtyard. A thoughtless militant is reprimanded for having prostrated himself before a wall on which by chance there was a poster--knocking before an image constitutes idolatry, growls a comrade. A harsh Arab maxim attributed to the Prophet (is it apocryphal?), pinned to the wall, condemns laughter as being indecent--so nobody cracks a smile. "Through Islam we will conquer the Russians!" a militant declares fiercely, "just as Islam has overthrown the Shah of Iran!"

A green booklet distributed to the journalists sets out the Party's program: the Constitution will draw its inspiration from the Koran and the "Sunna" (tradition); alcohol will be prohibited; apostasy will be punished: "Parda [purdah] for the women shall be introduced," women will once again be veiled. "But they will be educated," added the militant.

This atmosphere of cautious devotion, of finicky respect for ritual, is different from the atmosphere of deep but simple and unaffected piety among the Afghan peasants. An observer senses in the company of these young men, who incessantly refer to the Koran to justify every action of

thems under sun ("I took refuge in Pakistan, but did not Moses flee from Egypt and Mohammed from Mecca for the sake of the cause?", etc.), a touch of forced religiosity, sometimes a little theatrical. In actual fact, the Islamic Party movement took form in 1969 at Kabul University where Mr Hekmatyar was pursuing studies in engineering and where he became the first president of Moslem Youth.

At the same time the first communist parties were being built up. The People's Party, or Khalq, founded in 1965, won numerous followers from among the students, but it broke up in 1968 with the Maoists splitting off as well as the noteworthy Flag Party, or Parcham, around Mr Babrak Karmal, the present head of state. Numerous riots among students, Marxists and fundamentalist Moslems bathed the University in blood--Mr Hekmatyar is even said to have killed a Maoist student with his own hands in 1970.

All these students had in common the same modest rural background. The education imparted to them by the University was mediocre but it was enough to tear these young people away from the peaceful certainties of village tradition. Seeing themselves destined for junior and poorly paid positions of employment, disadvantaged students started to denounce absolutism and the royal family's corruption. Some of them, thirsting for a radical purification of their decadent society, found their faith in a strict Islam which would drive out the stench from the West; others, racked by the same desire, drew on Lenin's writings, which they understood only very imperfectly, and tried to apply the outlines of them to create a new Afghanistan.

Devoured by an irrational hatred for Islam--four young men who had lost their religious beliefs, the religious constraints of rural life actually became suffocating--the Marxists, however, had barely assimilated any Western culture, and they remained like cultural orphans. The disastrous result of that was seen between 1978 and 1980 when, in the service of the Taraki and Amin regimes, they sought to purge their society of its "corrupt" elements, Westernized intellectuals and Moslem clerics, at the same time.

How many victims has this repression had? Undoubtedly tens of thousands. The Marxists fought desperately against their rivals in the Islamic Party; many Peshawar militants, young men who are undoubtedly as wildly fanatical as their torturers, but who are now survivors of the Pol-3 Tcharkhi prison, have a martyr's halo: for many of them had strips of flesh torn out, were tortured with electric shocks, or were beaten with sticks into unconsciousness in the basements of the Ministry of the Interior.

"They Don't Mean Anything"

Indifferent when it comes to ideological quarrels, the desperate refugees congregate at the doors of the locations of the different groups, concentrated for the most part in the section of Peshawar called Faquirabad--

nicknames "Little Kabul" from then on. Militiamen guard the entryways, Kalashnikova slung over their shoulders; some family men are on their way home, weighed down by sacks of flour; but many men are waiting, for hours on end, in search of a little hope. (Many refugees send different members of their families to sign up with all the groups at the same time, in the hope of collecting a little more food.

In the crowd, wrapped up in shawls, a refugee pulls the visitor by his sleeve, leads him discreetly aside, and whispers to him: "Brother, you know these groups don't mean anything. As for us, we need weapons, food, everything. So we come here." The speaker is a young Hazara peasant with Mongolian features, and he came on foot--a 30-day walk--from the center of Afghanistan. Others joined him: clear-eyed Nuristanis with white caps on, turbanned Pashtuns with large noses and Assyrian-style beards; all of them are moving their head in confirmation: "Brother, these groups do not mean anything. They cheat us and they put on a show for the foreigners. We are where the resistance is. Inside the country."

Behind the facade of the Peshawar exile groups it seems that there is actually forming in Afghanistan a genuine internal network for resisting the invader, still clandestine but seeking to become known, and quite divorced from any ideological reference other than Islam as it is experienced by the vast majority of the Afghan people deep down inside them.

The Population in 1978

The population of Afghanistan included 17,000,000 inhabitants in 1978.

The principal ethnic groups among them are the following:

a) Pashtuns: 40 percent of the total. Sunni Moslems. Live in the east and south. Two million are nomads. Language: Pashto. (Pashtuns in the capital speak Farsi.)

b) Tadzhiks: 40 percent of the total. The term "Tadzhik" refers to ethnic Iranians in central Asia. Sunni Moslems (not Shi'ite like the Iranians). Live in the west, north, and far northeast. Language: Farsi.

c) Hazaras: 10 to 15 percent of the total. Of Mongolian origin. Shi'ite Moslems. Live in the central region and in Kabul. Language: Farsi.

d) Uzbeks, Turkomans, Turkic peoples in the north, and Nuristanis in the east make up the rest of the population map, if you add the Baluchi minority in the extreme south.

Languages: East Turkic; Burushaski (the languages of the Nuristanis); and Baluchi. All these population groups understand Farsi. They are Sunni Moslems.

We would point out that there are Soviet Socialist Republics of Turkomans, Uzbeks and Tadzhiks to the north, and a community of 8,000,000 Pashtuns in Pakistan where 2,000,000 Baluchis live as well.

'BURNED, GASSED, BURIED ALIVE' SAYS EYEWITNESS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 23 May 80 pp 56-57

[Interview with Mike Barry by Jacques Lebeau: "The 'I Accuse' of Mike Barry"]

[Text] At the very moment when NATO is firmly condemning the intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the government in Kabul is proposing a settlement of the Afghan "problem" backed up by a double guarantee from the USSR and the United States. At the same time, the fragmentary news coming out of Afghanistan do not enable us to form an exact opinion both as to the "nationalist resistance of the people" and as to Soviet intervention. We do know however that at least 4,000 students were arrested in Kabul over the past 2 weeks and that another 156 died during the uprising at the end of April. "Hezbe Islami," one of the Afghan resistance movements, asserts that the big town of Herat has fallen into the hands of the resistance and that 800 Afghan military personnel, commanded by Soviets, have been encircled in the eastern part of the country since 12 May; 500 reportedly died in the province of Verda. Finally, more than 5,000 Czechoslovak soldiers reportedly arrived in Afghanistan to fight side by side with the Soviet troops. One voice was raised in this flood of confused and sometimes contradictory news: The American ethnologist Mike Barry, 32, formally charged the Soviet Union with using napalm and chemical gases against the population in Afghanistan. "The invader's mission is to organize the genocide of the Afghan people," says Mike Barry. He collected scores of eyewitness reports in the refugee camps in Pakistan. Right now, he is preparing a summary report which will be published early in June in LES TEMPS MODERNES. This document will be widely disseminated to all of the Western media and government organizations. As "official observer from the International Federation of Human Rights," Mike Barry was charged by the

United States Congress with gathering eyewitness testimony on the atrocities committed by the Afghan and Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In particular, he was to observe the employment of napalm and chemical weapons against the civilian population or the members of the resistance who oppose Soviet invasion or the establishment of communism in their country. Mike Barry agreed to open his files in an exclusive interview for LE FIGARO MAGAZINE.

"Dead silence has fallen on Afghanistan whose violent occupation constitutes one of the most serious problems of the Eighties! Contrary to what the current authorities in Kabul continue to maintain, the three coups d'Etat, which in vain tried to impose socialism upon the Afghan people, signified a constant increase in repression whose ultimate purpose we can detect today: Total war, conducted by Soviet troops who are firmly determined, by terror and sophisticated military technology, to impose an ideology which the vast majority of the Afghan people would never want any part of.

"As the special emissary of the FIDH (International Federation of Human Rights), I have just spent more than a month in the refugee camps along the Pakistani border where I have been able to collect many eyewitness accounts in the Afghan, Persian, or Pushtu languages concerning the atrocities committed by the Afghan or Soviet troops. A rigorous analysis of these eyewitness accounts enables us to come up with an initial overview.

"We can distinguish police or penitentiary repression, which is directed above all against the urban population, from military operations which are ravaging the rural areas, the valleys, and the mountains. In both cases, however, the presence and responsibility of Soviet 'advisors' has been formally noted by a number of refugees and this was true as of the seizure of power by the pro-Soviet regime of Taraki in April of 1978! Right now, more than 2 million peasants in central Hazaradjat are encircled by troops of the Red Army; they are cut off without hope of resupply; they are doomed to die of hunger before the end of June! The border valley of Kunar has been completely 'cleared' of its inhabitants.

"At the end of March, President Kharmal revealed that his predecessors, Amin and Taraki, had ordered the execution of 1.5 million persons!

"Napalm bombings of numerous villages, defoliants and incapacitating gases, 'fragmentation' bombs, hundreds of persons being buried alive in common trenches or ditches, tortures, destruction and razing of harvests, dikes, and entire villages by bulldozers--what the refugees told me is atrocious and inconceivable."

Napalm

Eyewitness account by a Pashtoon [Pathan] peasant woman questioned in the Kababian camp. She escaped from the district of Sorkh-Roud on the road leading from Kabul to Pakistan. This eyewitness account expresses the population's terror in the face of the threat of deportation and also the "fire-jet bomb" (napalm).

"Home, village--they took everything from us. My father, my mother, and my brother were killed in the 'Jihad' (holy war). Everybody was killed and the trees were burning; I ran all the way here. We saw bombings and we ran. The Soviets took the young women away and left the old ones there. We hid under a tree and they threw gasoline on the tree and everything burned! We ran across the irrigation canals, the tank pursued us and everything started burning. They destroyed the wheat. The harvest has been burned. They killed our children. They do not even allow us to bury our dead! We ran and overhead flew the airplanes. Ratatat! Ratatat! The trees were in splinters! Homes were wrecked! And the children! My little boy is dead! It was the Soviets who did it, the Soviets!

"They are even burning the mosques with gasoline, gasoline that burns; it is like petroleum; they throw it and it catches fire; they drop it from high up, from airplanes and also from tanks and everything gets dark. You rub your eyes with your fingers.

"The 'Khalkis'--the communists--came to our village and said: 'We need the land of Afghanistan, we do not need any Muslims. We are going to kill the Muslims.'"

Buried Alive

Eyewitness report by surviving peasants from villages near Kabul who witnessed mass executions at Pol-e-Goun. Group interview in Persian and Pushtu at Kabatian camp.

"We lived at Pol-e-Goun which was a firing range where the soldiers used to practice with their machineguns. We had a 'molawi' (religious dignitary) in the village of Deh-Sabz. He was under arrest for 8 months. When he came back, the entire village rose up behind him. We picked up our shovels and our hoes, our sickles and some of us even had shotguns. We assembled near the airport.

"Then they came to kill us. The people who were taken in the village were machine-gunned! That was some killing! And 2,000 persons perished under the bombings.

"Then the communists rounded up all the survivors, the good officers who were Muslims, the mullahs, everybody; they rounded them up in order to

throw them into the Pol-e-Charkhi prison. At 2300, they blindfolded them and their trucks, three trucks, arrived every night.

"They dug ditches and then they threw the prisoners down in there, firing on them from above with a machinegun! Along the road from Tara-Khel or Bala-Hesar, very near the village of Deh-Sabz, there are nothing but dead all over the place! I saw the Soviets bury them alive! We have never seen any such tyranny! They throw them into the ditch and they shovel earth on them from above! The feet stick out! You see legs wearing 'darishi' (European trousers), legs with 'kala' ('^ghan trousers) and soldiers' boots. Now the Soviets take those boots away. The trucks arrive full, with people piled on top of each other--living and dead together! They dump them into the ditch and they cover them up with dirt! They sprinkle gasoline on living human beings! One fellow began to run and the soldiers killed him but the others were too well tied up! For 24 hours, all day and all night, the smell of boiling fat floated above our village!"

Sa'd Meskinyar, 28, a teacher in a high school in the province of Laghman. He had been a militant of the Islamic Party for a long time. He is an active member of the resistance in the eastern part of the country. He taped his account in Persian at Peshawar.

"I was in Laghman at Ali-Shang with the Resistance. I was the aide of the front commander in that region. One of our resistance members, Hadjsaheb Babou, was captured by the Afghan troops. They tortured him to find out where the others were since they were attacking the village and the mosque. They grabbed 650 unfortunates and took them to a deserted field. There they buried them alive! In 16 big common ditches, 10 meters by 10 meters, each!

"The soldiers came from the valley with 'Russian advisors.' The people were arrested and executed on their orders. It was the communist Afghan soldiers who executed them. Their commander, a man by the name of Stana-Gol [illegible in photostat] ordered the people to be buried alive. A prisoner was brought before him and he said quickly: 'Bury him alive!'

"After they left, we dug up the people who had been executed in order to give them a proper burial. After that, the watchword has been to find the bodies of the martyrs. I was detachment commander. There were ditches full of resistance members! In each ditch, in each trench, there would be an average of 50 or 60 persons. We had to bury them, four by four. There was to be no planting on top of these ditches. In this way we dug up 650 martyrs not far from the village. The inhabitants helped us. My brother told me that 12 resistance members were captured in the village of Ali-Shang and were then taken to the Ghani-Khel prison near Nangrahar. After seven nights in prison, they were buried in a deserted field next to the prison. Only one fellow--Khasta-Gol--managed to escape by crawling out of the ditch into which he had been thrown. He came all the way here, to

the camp at Peshawar. Then he returned in order to fight side by side with the resistance in Kunar.

Gassing

Eyewitness report by Gol-Akbar, 50, from the village of Shinkorak, in Kunar, obtained in the Khazana camp, in Pakistan, and recorded in Persian and Pushtu.

"On the first day of the attack on my village, the tanks came at 0600; there were also 150 or 180 men who arrived on board bizarre aircraft (probably helicopters!). The tanks advanced, with the airplanes overhead. We moved out against them. The tanks advanced and fired. They killed everybody. We were powerless. They arrived at the village and the bombing began; everybody who was on the road was killed. There were 150 tanks. In front of the tanks, there was another type of tank which we called the 'dust-pusher' (khak-awor) (probably bulldozers!); there is a shovel in front and it makes a road! We are courageous men but we simply could not stand up to that. Their airplanes dropped bombs. A kind of bomb which, in my dreams, I would never have imagined: A bomb which cuts through the air and which turns into 100 or 150 other bombs! Everybody, the people, the earth, the rocks, the trees, the animals, even the river--they were all swept away!

"They were also dropping gas. That made up cry. I did not see the gas but it got into my eyes. They also used something else which burns the body, which made us itch so terribly that we had to drop our Kalashnikovs. We did not see that gas and I do not know where it came from. When the gas fell on the people, there was nothing they could do! And then, also, the Soviets used something which made us laugh ('khand-awor'). They dropped it and it made us laugh, like crazy! We became insane like that for about half an hour or an hour, I do not know. We ran between the tanks and we laughed! We had forgotten everything! We kept laughing like that but then the whole thing stopped. The Soviets grabbed those who were trying to get away and took them along."

Mike Barry's Eyewitness Report on Gassing

"The incapacitating gases employed by the Red Army outside the village of Shinkorak seem to have been chemical crowd-control agents: A highly concentrated lacrymogen, an odorless and colorless skin irritant, and a laughing gas. On 19 March 1980, a mullah from Shinkorak witnessed 13 persons from his village being asphyxiated and he himself and some of his companions had to save their lives by soaking their handkerchiefs in the river and then covering the nose and mouth. They also projected a vapor from helicopters causing blisters on the skin. This was probably an irritant chemical gas.

"Other eyewitness reports reached me from Nuristan, where the inhabitants for the past 2 months had watched Soviet aircraft drop capsules releasing a greyish smoke above their valleys. Because the valleys are so narrow, the smoke spread over the hillsides and sticks to the hilltops instead of coming down. Daylight was thus obscured for several hours. Another witness also described to me a bomb which releases a smoke, which sticks to terrain features in the form of heavy dark clouds and which gives you a bitter taste in the mouth; then you get a terrible headache, burns in the eyes and in the lower limbs; it causes fainting and death!

"According to the Pentagon experts, this is a deadly gas--Soman--which attacks the nervous system and which was vaporized over the regions of the northeast. A NATO expert recently declared that the USSR is using 'persistent' gases in Afghanistan, in other words, chemical warfare agents which are used particularly to neutralize vast areas through which the Soviet convoys move. In the cold areas, the persistent gases remain effective for many weeks. The Mujahi, whose shoes come into contact with toxic agents, then mortally contaminated areas to which they move; the moment they enter a heated place, the gas evaporates and becomes lethal!"

Drownings

Eyewitness report by Hosayn, 43, who held a high position in a government cultural agency at Kabul, taped in Persian at Peshawar.

"The worst of all repressions took place at Samagan, in a village in the Yousof valley. The Hazara people had risen up and the entire prefecture was in revolt. They had killed the communist officials without any casualties to themselves. Upon the approach of the occupation army, they escaped into the mountains.

"The people who had escaped were contacted by a communist spy who passed himself off as a 'sayyed', a descendant of the Prophet. And he reassured all those who had fled by telling them: 'You will not be bothered. You will not be killed. Come back down into your village. The abuses will be corrected and your rights will be respected.' Finally, the people came back down. But that was a trick. The soldiers took more than 1,500 young people, tied their hands and blindfolded them and then they threw all of them, alive, into the Amu River. It was the Russians who did that."

Tortures

Eyewitness report by Mohammed Ashraf, former professor at the University of Kabul, 44, imprisoned in the Pol-e-Charkhi prison for 48 months, recorded in English at Peshawar.

"I was involved in antigovernment political activities with a group of friends. We were secretly preparing an attempted coup d'Etat. All my

friends were arrested and tortured. Many of them resisted and died but one of the tortured individuals mentioned my name when they brought his wife in and began to torture her with electricity before his own eyes.

"On the next day, they came to arrest me in my office. I was taken to the Ministry of the Interior in a place especially used for torture, the 'Akse' which is an underground prison where they locked me up with seven other persons.

"Torture sessions lasted from 2200 until 0400. The methods included beatings with steel cables and sticks, electricity, including a kind of 'electric chair' to which the victim is tied. Sometimes the suspect was also suspended by his hands, with his feet just off the floor. I remained there, like that, at one time for more than 52 hours! The Russian 'advisors' were reading our papers with the answers and added more scientific, more psychological questions.

"That took 25 days, 24 hours a day.

"I was on the third floor and I was able to watch the executions. At night, in the courtyard, they stood the people up against the wall and they shone a kind of blue light at them. Then they were shot down in groups of ten persons or twenty persons. Once, there were 45. On another night, 120 were killed in this fashion!

"Sometimes they forced the prisoners to dig their own graves; they were thrown in alive and they were then covered with dirt by bulldozers.

"Throughout those 18 months, I had no doctor visit me, no lawyer, no judge. Our food was filthy and was served in dishes full of microbes-- a few bits and pieces of carrots floating in water and some drops of margarine oil. In the winter it was really rough: Below 20 and even below 25, without any heat! And all you had for a blanket was the earth!"

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CSO: 4900

'SPA' REPORTS INTERVIEW WITH BAHRAIN AMIR

LD111453 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1330 GMT 11 Jun 80

[Text] Jidda--His Excellency the Amir of Bahrain Shaykh 'Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifah has stressed that coordination between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain exists and is continuing in all spheres which realize general good for the two sister countries. In an interview with the periodical AL-MAJALLAH in tomorrow's issue he said "Bahrain calls for continuing meetings among the Gulf countries to discuss the issues of the region in order not to leave an opportunity for mediation or intervention in the affairs of the Gulf states which are linked together by bonds of religion, language and good neighborliness."

The amir of Bahrain expressed his pride in the kingdom's policy distinguished by wisdom and prudence. His highness denied the existence of any military bases in Bahrain. He said Bahrain is against any foreign military bases in the region, because foreign military presence reflects on the safety and stability of the region.

Regarding the statements of some Iranian officials harmful to Bahrain, Shaykh 'Isa said that these statements have been denied by the Iranian Government in toto and in detail, and that these statements were unofficial. He stressed that the visit of the Iranian foreign minister had a great effect in clarifying relations between Bahrain and Iran. His highness referred to the recent visit of the French defense minister to Bahrain. He said that the existing military coordination between Bahrain and France to develop the armed forces of Bahrain resulted in total understanding about conditions in Bahrain and the Gulf. He said that the development of the Bahrain forces is a continuing process tied to a timed program.

CSO: 4802

NATIONAL OIL COMPANY REVIEWS '79 PROGRESS

GF040735 Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 4 Jun 80 p 1

[Text] Bahrain's gas supplies will extend will into the 21st century.

That is the message from the National Oil Company's review published yesterday.

Although oil production is declining by more than five per cent annually, the Banagas project has a 30-year-plus future, says the annual survey.

Introducing the review, Banoco managing director Hasan Fakhru said 1979 was a successful and inspiring year for the company, climaxing in the opening of the \$100-million Banagas project.

Other milestones were the transfer of ownership of oil-production facilities from Bapco to the Bahrain Government, and agreement on a \$300-million joint petro complex between Banoco and the Petrochemical Industries Company of Kuwait. The plant is expected to be in operation in Bahrain by the end of 1982.

The sharp rise in propane and butane prices means that the Banagas project will be paid off within a short time, says Mr Fakhru.

The company is also actively involved in sponsoring a number of training programmes, with more than 100 trainees studying in Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Britain and at Gulf Technical College.

Studies are underway at a cost of \$1.8-million on increasing oil recovery, which last year stood at almost 50,000 barrels per day from 242 wells.

The company's six service stations are to be augmented by others to be opened this year, to keep pace with the projected ten per cent per year increase in local petrol and diesel sales.

Solar energy studies are still being undertaken in co-operation with the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, with proposals now being studied for capturing solar energy with photovoltaic cells.

The company's accounting and personnel systems are to be computerized, following an agreement signed with NCR.

The report says that this year almost three million barrels of propane, butane and naphtha should be available.

"1979 was a very big year for Banoco," says Mr Fakhru.

CSO: 4802

KHOMENYI'S APPROACH TO SHI'ITE 'MESSIANISM'

Paris REMARQUES ARABO-AFRICAINES in French No 525 Jan-Feb 80 pp 12-13

[Text] The referendum, on the draft constitution, which was presented to the Iranians was disappointing for the regime. It was its first failure, it was said, a failure which was all the more surprising in that it happened after the intense general mobilization against the United States, which had led up to the reconciliation of the left with the patriarch of Qom, to a truce in Kurdistan. How is it explained?

It is perhaps less the theocratic aspect of the new constitution which upset the parties and the voters than the absolute powers accorded to the imam who has become the "a'elayat faguih," the "supreme religious leader." These absolute powers contradict the "people's sovereignty" proclaimed elsewhere. Mr Bani-Sadr had emphasized it and he made a great effort to modify the text. It was all in vain as he only obtained a few changes.

The constitution gives the imam (and his successors) (article 110) full powers over the army, authorizes him to declare war and sign a peace treaty, to choose the candidate for the presidency of the republic, to remove the chief of state, on the recommendation of the Supreme Court or the National Assembly, to appoint or suspend the judges, to modify the judgments of the courts. In short, it acknowledges him as an absolute authority but does not assign him any responsibility. What a difference from the Imperial constitution which did not breathe a word about the shah's powers and no one is unaware that he exercised them all, even going beyond them!

Then, is Iran alternating from one despotism to another? Yes, if it is admitted that one was imposed, that the other is--until now--accepted, if not by the intelligentsia, at the very least by the majority of the disinherited (mostafazin).

The liberals are not the only ones to oppose the draft constitution. Had they been the only ones, it would have passed without great difficulties. The toughest opposition comes from the national minorities, who would be the population's majority if they were to succeed in joining forces. None

of their demands, whether it be autonomy or self-determination, is mentioned. Anger is raging among the Kurds. Shi'ism, the established state religion, ignores the millions of Sunni Muslims (Baluchis, Turkomans, Arabs). Tabriz, capital of Azerbaijan, does not side behind Khomeyni, but behind Shariatmadari, an ayatollah who is not revolutionary but liberal.

The constitution, adopted just as it is, risks making the Iranian mosaic break into pieces unless, of course, the immense popularity of Khomeyni, his charismatic aura, which is even more influential than Nasir's, surmounts all the obstacles. A miraculous eventuality which is always possible in the world of Islam.

The reign of God is proclaimed in Iran. Imam Khomeyni, "supreme religious leader" of a clerical republic, that is, governed by religious, who are according to him the best rulers since they know the law of God, is inaugurating the first theocracy in contemporary Islam, before Saudi Arabia and Libya, before Pakistan, which are states under Shari'a (Islamic canon law) but are led by laymen. This is an important difference. The Holy City on earth, this was Savonarola's utopia. It ended badly. Is this the same end which awaits Khomeyni?

Perhaps. He accepts it in advance, and with him, all Shi'ites accept it. Their faith exalts the glory of martyrs. Ali and Hussein, the tragedy of Kerbela dramatize a religion through the exaltation of suffering and death. Consider the processions of Achoura: under the dais of green and black banners, the penitents whip themselves until they draw blood while repeating the cry "Hussein, Hassan!" a thousand times; Yazid, son of Moawiyah, responsible for the crime of Kerbela, is likened to Satan. Today Carter relieved Yazid.

Shi'ism differs from Sunni orthodoxy by its passion, its trance, and also its prophetic nature, which confers it with a dangerous fascination. Immaculate Shi'ism asserts itself as a saving religion, because it is based on the expectation of the Mahdi (messiah) who is to make justice rule on the earth. The Mahdi is the twelfth imam, the twelfth heir of the Prophet. History, for Shi'ism, all takes place between man and God. No progress like in Marxist thought, but an inward enlightenment.

What brings Khomeyni to this vision of the world? What is his role in contemporary Shi'ism? For Darius Shayegan, an Iranian philosopher, it is the role of a Luther-type reformer. He says to Catherine Clement (LE MATIN, 23-11-1979): "...Khomeyni, without wanting to, began the secularization of Islam. And he does it, paradoxically, by returning to the sources of the Koran; but by carrying out this return, he denies all tradition... It is as if the Catholic Church, today, denied all its history. Khomeyni succeeds very well in deeply rousing the collective Iranian subconscious and there is an historical explanation for this phenomenon. There are precedents for a radical dispute in the religious and political history of Iran. And it dates back to the beginnings: in

the tradition of the great "Magi", which dates back to pre-Archimedian, therefore pre-Islamic, history. Look at the Manicheism of Khomeyni, the manner in which he presents everything in black or white, evil or good, without compromise: this is much more Iranian--and Persian--than Islamic."

In Shi'ism the imam has as much weight as the Prophet. He is declared infallible, he cannot be wrong, this is why he is blindly believed, even when he affirms the opposite of the truth. The attempt against Mecca's Sacred Mosque attributed by Khomeyni to the Americans provoked the burning of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, riots in Dacca, Srinagar and Izmir; so great is the cult of the Imam that his word cannot be challenged. He is holy. He is the heir of a line of martyrs. We are in a devotional religion. To act like the imam is to act against God [sic]. He who dares is impious. The jihad (holy war) is mobilized against the one who dares. Another difference with Sunnism and which is true of the Imam, he interprets the "hidden" meaning of things, which counts more in Shi'ism than the apparent meaning revealed by tradition. Therefore, the new constitution gave a special place to the idea of "velayat faguhi" (the imam's full power). Article 2 stipulates that "the Islamic republic is above all a system based on divine revelation and the role which it plays in the expression of the laws, as well as on the Last Judgment day and the prefectible evolution toward God."

The Iranian integritism troubles the Sunni establishment. The Arab heads of state are uneasy about the repercussions of Khomeyni "messianism" on the masses. The demanding and wrangling shi'ism--it is all the more demanding and wrangling as it is clearly a minority in Islam--threatens the powers in office, when it is incapable of assuring the authority of the state, tormented as it is by its internal opposition, when it occupies the power. Khomeyni's Iran is foundering in discord. Parallel authorities double the legal authority, reducing it to impotence. Mehdi Bazargan, prime minister of a phantom cabinet, was overthrown by Bani-Sadr, who was overthrown by Sadeq Qotbzadeh, who capitulates to the students and Khomeyni who supports them.

At the Tunis summit, the Arab states boycotted the Iranian delegation. They all condemn the taking of hostages at the American Embassy in Tehran, they all call for the liberation of the students' prisoners, even Libya which nevertheless supports Khomeyni's cause. If they fear the Khomeyni contagion, it is because they know what hatred the Arab masses vow to the United States, protectors of Israel, and to Menachem Begin; it is because they know that Khomeyni appears to many Moslems as Islam's revenge on an exploiting and incomprehensible West.

But Iraq is surprised that the Islamic republic threatens the independence of Bahrain in spite of the United Nations vote which confirmed it, continues the occupation of the three islands of the Gulf which were annexed

by the Shah and refuses the Arabs of Khuzestan any right to autonomy, when it multiplies the professions of anti-imperialist faith. The PLO, which offered to mediate in the hostage affair, was invited to mind its own business; it did not hide its disappointment. As a matter of fact, "revolutionary" Iran is alone, alone in the Arab world, alone in the Moslem Duma. And undoubtedly the hermit of Qom likes being alone. Believing that he is right about everything, this comforts he who does not doubt, who never doubts. Mr Bani-Sadr, an advisor listened to by the imam, and who became minister of foreign affairs,* regretted Iran's absence at the Security Council session, saying with reason that the refusal to have a dialogue was detrimental to a cause which was arousing echoes of sympathy here and there; he reproached the students for their scandalous violation of the law, contrary to all morals, including Islamic morals. A non-conformity which he paid for with his dismissal, until his revenge today. Sadeq Gorbzadeh, his rival, who took his place, did not have reason to be pleased. Therefore, Iran is closing up on itself. Will it rediscover in isolation that identity which pains it to have lost and for which the shah's dictatorship and American interests are responsible? It is hoped that it will for what Iran represented before the Pahlavis, for Hafiz, Omar Khayyam, Shah Abbas, Ispahan and Shiraz, for Mjanum and Layla, for Persian miniatures, for the elegance of a culture and the subtlety of thought. It is hoped that it will out of respect for its disinherited. May the ordeal of force turn to the ordeal of truth, where it will find its best arguments. Justice will then be administered to it and justice will be administered to the Third World. Today, Bani-Sadr is president. Let us hope that the sky will clear up!

* and who was obliged to "resign" consequently

9181

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IMPLICIT ADMISSION OF 'DISLOYALTY' EXISTING IN ARMY

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 May 80 p 9

[Article by J. M. Durand - Souffland

[Text] The most important air and naval exercises, ever organized since the Iranian Revolution, have been going on since Monday 11 May in the Strait of Hormuz under the personal supervision of President Bani-Sadr who is on board a destroyer off the island of Abu Musa. Navy, army and air force commando units and marines will attempt to prove over a period of 48 hours that they are capable of defending Iranian territorial waters in that highly strategic area.

On the other hand, there seems to be a worsening of the uneasy feelings in the armed forces judging from the appeal that the Attorney General of the Republic made on Monday morning urging the military authorities to hand over to him "all the revolutionary agents" who are guilty of causing unrest, plotting, spying and encouraging rebellion.

Contradicting recent statements made by President Bani-Sadr, Iman Khomeyni has declared that "only native people who play into the hands of the enemy can believe the rumors of a coup d'etat."

But the "guide of the revolution" has implicitly admitted that part of the army was disloyal to the revolution and that "the people will destroy it with their hands and teeth."

Tehran--For a long time it has been known that things were far from being right inside the Iranian Army which, after being under the traditional military authority, was bluntly thrown shortly after the revolution took place into the ill-defined and, for all purposes, totally inadequate guardianship of the Islamic Republic.

Within the space of a few months, the soldiers of the Imperial Army went from a regime of discipline, known to be extremely strict, into a state of lethargy and even inaction while being carefully looked after by a government which, since last summer, had been apprehensive about the possibility of a coup d-etat and had kept a particularly alert watch over garrisons and armories, over air bases which are some of the best supplied in the world and have the most sophisticated equipment, and particularly over the clubs where the officers reduced to forced inactivity could very well kill time by turning into plotters.

After being kept for a long time away from all the activity going on outside the perimeter of its garrisons, the Iranian Army has surfaced again in recent weeks. Thanks to the conflict which has brought bloodshed to Kurdistan, the president of the republic, whom Iman Khomeyni recently appointed as supreme commander of the armed forces, notified the army that it was ordered to participate along with the Revolutionary Guard--or, should we say, "under its authority"--in the massacre of Kurdish autonomists whom the government continues to consider as nothing but "counterrevolutionaries" and "enemies of Islam paid by the United States" or else as "mercenaries instigated by Iraq."

Even if based on purely logical reasons, Bani-Sadr's decision to call on the military to reestablish order in a province, the determination of which no longer needs to be demonstrated, appears to be dangerous since he is asking a disillusioned and hurt army to make its reentry in the Iranian scene by taking part in what can only be described as a civil war.

We know now that he lost the gambit, no doubt about it. After the conviction and immediate execution of an officer accused of "refusing to follow orders" during the fighting in Kurdistan, which has been going on for over a month, it is reported that 38 officers, NCOs and servicemen, also suspected of having refused to fire their weapons against fellow Muslims, even "rebel" ones, had been arrested. During that same period, 13 officers serving under the Esfahan region military command, were accused of fomenting disturbances in the midst of the armed forces and were brought up before a military tribunal on charges of "cooperating with the counterrevolutionaries." Seven of them were sentenced to prison terms ranging between 2 years and life imprisonment while the other 6 were released.

Many Desertions

It is no secret that scores of military men from all ranks including officers and, we have been told, even a colonel deserted during the siege of Sanandaj with their weapons and kit and joined the Pershmergas whom they had refused to fight.

Needless to say that the government is deeply concerned by this situation. Orders have gone out for the adoption of "strict measures" aimed at completely reorganizing the army while private and state-owned industries have been explicitly asked to "promptly satisfy all military requests of supplies." Bani-Sadr himself had told the commander in chief of the three services "to take all the necessary steps to maintain a strict discipline and to avoid any instance of disobedience or negligence."

But since Iran is an outstanding example of a country of contradictions, developments as disturbing as the abovementioned were bound to be countered by somebody's reassuring remarks. Defense Minister Mostafa Chamran did this when he praised "the brave and gallant government forces." In a message addressed to the population of Paveh, one of the last towns where clashes between the forces of law and order and Kurdish fighters are still reported, Chamran said that he was pleased to see that the army "had shown that it was perfectly capable of crushing the counterrevolutionary forces" and of preventing them "from achieving their evil purposes." If he who has the last word is right, then Chamran could not be wrong...

8796

CSO: 4900

JORDAN REQUESTS DATA ABOUT MEDITERRANEAN SEA-DEAD SEA CANAL

TA271514 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 27 May 80 p 7

[Article by Yisra'el Tomer]

[Text] "The Jordanian Kingdom has expressed interest in the plans for digging a canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea. We have provided this information to the Jordanians," Energy and Infrastructure Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i said yesterday.

In a tour of the recommended site for the "seas canal" Minister Moda'i revealed that international interest had already been expressed in financing this project which "would change the laws of nature." The minister believes that there will be no need for government financing. According to Moda'i, this plan should be turned into a pioneering project which would be financed by international funds.

In its interim report, the steering committee headed by Prof Yuval Ne'eman, recommended the southern site, beginning near Dayr al-Balah in the Gaza Strip. The canal would first be open for 20 km, then near Kibbutz Nirim, a 5-meter wide and 86-km long tunnel would be excavated. This canal would transport water to the Massada area. Collecting pools and an electric power station would be established in the area of Massada. The station will be activated by a 400-meter high waterfall created by the difference in heights in the area. The planned power station will produce 570 megawatts of electricity, which constitute about 80 percent of Israel's current electricity consumption.

Referring to fears about political obstacles stemming from the future of Gaza--where the "seas canal" will begin--Minister Moda'i said that in any event the Gaza Strip will remain connected to Israel in the economic sphere.

In the tour it was stated that the economic profitability of the canal has already been proven and that the electricity produced by the new power station would be cheap. The canal project also meshes with a larger plan for establishing solar pools in the Dead Sea which will supply 1.5 megawatts of electricity within 10 years.

It was also reported that an artificial lake will be excavated along the canal, in the area of Halutza. The lake will become a tourist site and will be the location for establishing a nuclear reactor which will use water from the Mediterranean Sea to cool the reactor.

Minister Moda'i said that the excavation of the canal will be one of the largest national projects in the next few years. According to him, the decision-making and planning processes will last about 3 years. The work in the field will last from 3 to 5 years.

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

WILLINGNESS TO JOIN PEACE TALKS--King Husayn of Jordan would be willing to join the peace talks on condition that Israel makes a final concession of its sovereignty over Judaea and Samaria and declares the establishment of a federal Jordanian-Palestinian state and recognize an internationalized Jerusalem. This was reported by reliable sources to our correspondent in Paris, Freddy Eytan. Our correspondent also learned that several European countries, Saudi Arabia and Morocco would be prepared to encourage Husayn in the peace efforts. Our correspondent adds that, according to the reliable sources, Husayn is waiting for the alignment's rise to power in Israel in order to negotiate. [Text] [TA261134 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 26 May 80]

POLITICAL POLICY OUTLINED--Information Minister Dr Sa'id al-Tall has stated that His Majesty King Husayn's visit to the United States derives from Jordan's conviction on the need to conduct a positive dialog and to hold contacts with various countries in the world, in order to clarify the Arab stand, explain the Arab issue and to avoid leaving the international field free to the viewpoints of other sides, particularly Israel. Dr al-Tall explained that the EEC statement includes several principles that agree with some of the Arabs' aspirations. He added: Still, the statement is not devoid of several negative aspects, which we should continuously seek to eradicate. Dr al-Tall was speaking at a meeting today with local press editors and writers. He expounded on the philosophy of Jordan's political action, which is based on dialog, positiveness and the rejection of negativity. Dr al-Tall explained that the positiveness required and meant is that which is accomplished within the framework of our principles, epitomized in our national and pan-Arab interests. The information minister reiterated Jordan's rejection of any unilateral approach to the basic Arab issue, any approach which does not realize pan-Arab interests and which is not based on Arab solidarity and joint Arab action. [Text] [JN151646 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 15 Jun 80]

BACKGROUND GIVEN FOR PHALANGIST-LIBERAL CEASE-FIRE

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 18 Apr 80 p 9

[Article: "What Is Behind the Militia War in al-Safra? 'Preliminary' Agreement Between the Phalangists and Liberals for a Cease-Fire and Forces Withdrawal"]

[Text] News from the eastern district mentioned that after the violent clashes of the day before yesterday in the town of al-Safra, the Phalangist and Liberal Parties have agreed to a cease fire, to opening the Beirut-Tripoli road, and to regrouping the heavy weaponry.

Starting at 1000 yesterday, after a quiet morning, shooting prevailed all along the coastal strip stretching from al-Ma'amalatayn to the Ibrahim River area.

Before long, the shooting developed into an artillery bombardment which lasted until 1300. Then the situation began calming down again.

Contacts

Yesterday Kamil Cham'oun had begun contacting his son Danny, who was in the al-Safra area, informing him of the situation.

At 1000, Cham'oun chaired a meeting of the secretariat of the Liberal Nationalists' Party, in which all aspects of the new situation in the Kisrwan coastal region were discussed. He informed those at the meeting that the situation had calmed down and had begun to return to what are normal circumstances for that region.

The secretariat discussed a number of solutions, including handing over the area's security to the Lebanese army as a preface to its taking up positions along the entire coastal road.

Then Cham'oun received a delegation from al-Kislik, which included Father Bulus Na'man, Abbot Butrus Qassi, and Father Anton Karan, who gave him an idea of what was happening in that area. Then the members of the delegation,

accompanied by Charles 'Asatayn, Cyril Bastras and Nabil Karam from the Liberal Party, went to the Phalangist party council, where Bashir al-Jumayyil was chairing a meeting of council members and officials from the Phalangist Kiarwan region. Those present discussed the investigations into what was happening in the Kiarwan region, and then agreed on the following decisions: to open the Tripoli-Beirut road and to effect a general reconciliation between the people of al-'Aqibah, al-Bawar, al-Safra, Tabarja, Kafr Yasin, and al-Ma'amalatayn, under the supervision of the region's religious authorities, provided that after this the heavy weaponry in the hands of the parties be withdrawn and placed in barracks far from the region and residential areas.

Then those at the meeting informed Cham'oun and P erre Jumayyil of the results of the contacts and agreements concluded, and the ongoing negotiations and what was arrived at.

At 1230, Deputy Amin al-Jumayyil arrived at the home of Cham'oun and met with him. They were then joined by Jumayyil's father, and the meeting lasted a half hour, during which all aspects of the situation were discussed.

The elder Jumayyil did not make any statement at the end of the meeting, while his son said, "Ask Cham'oun, for he can reassure public opinion better than I can."

Phalangist party sources said that the militias agreed to withdraw their armed personnel, starting at 1900 yesterday (Thursday), and to open the road through al-Ma'amalatayn, Tabarja, al-Safra, al-Bawar, and al-Aqibah. It was also agreed to withdraw the equipment and remove the barricades.

Motives

What were the long-range reasons for the clashes?

Informed circles indicate that the Phalangists blamed Cham'oun exclusively for conducting contacts with the Palestinian resistance and for approaching the army, "in an attempt to militarily scale down the Phalangists," in their words.

These circles are reminding everyone that the Phalangist and Liberal Parties are privately trading accusations for the wave of assassinations which has taken place recently in the eastern zone.

They say that Cham'oun fears the results of Phalangist contacts with Syria, as well as Phalangist control over the Cham'ounist spheres of influence.

These circles point out that the recent clashes broke out after the Phalangist party council insisted on invading the town of al-Safra, which is considered a main stronghold of the Liberals.

In another context, the day before yesterday Public Prosecutor Muhammad al-Sufi, who had been injured during the clashes which took place in the al-Safra area, arrived in Tripoli after being treated at the Saint Louis Hospital in Juni, where his wounds from being hit by a stray bullet were bandaged. At the time of the incident, he was accompanied by Jamal Yasin, Hisham Darbas, and Faruz Darbas.

RELATIONS BETWEEN PHALANGISTS AND SYRIA SAID TO BE IMPROVING

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 26 Apr 80 pp 14-17

[Text] The visit to Beirut next week of Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam is expected to mark a new turn in relations between Lebanon and Syria. A turn which coincides with--and is perhaps due to--the internal developments in Syria as well as in the region as a whole. It is still too early to say whether the newly-resumed Lebanese-Syrian dialogue will lead to an overall improvement of the situation and to national accord in Lebanon. But, two conclusions can already be drawn: on the one hand, Syria is intensifying its moves towards the Lebanese Front, and in particular the Phalangist Party, and, on the other hand, this rapprochement is increasing the concern of the current allies of Syria in Lebanon about the future of their relations.

Opened on the occasion of the visit to Damascus of Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros, the still timid Lebanese-Syrian dialogue was pursued in military talks between the two countries and then by manoeuvres of rapprochement between the Phalangist Party and Damascus. Two representatives of the Phalangist Party--Politburo members Karin Pakradouni and Georges Saadeh--visited Damascus more than once and these talks produced a positive result in leading to an exchange of prisoners between the two sides.

The exchange of prisoners between Syria and the Phalangist Party last week--in which 16 Phalangist were returned against 55 Syrians and pro-Syrians--has given to certain observers the impression of a state dealing with another state, rather than a state dealing with a political group. It was perhaps to alleviate this impression that no publicity was made around the liberation of the 55 Phalangist-held Syrian and pro-Syrian detainees who were released 5 days before the 16 Phalangist detainees were handed over. The release of the latter was much publicized, however.

The resumption of dialogue between the Phalangist Party and Syria and the exchange of prisoners between the two sides came to confirm speculations that the resumption of dialogue between Lebanon and Syria hinged very much on an improvement of relations between the Syrian regime and the rightwing party.

Before looking into the reasons that have prompted Syria to accept the re-opening of a dialogue with the Phalangists, it is worth looking into the positions of the two sides as expressed in the preliminary contacts made towards the dialogue.

The Syrian Position. The Phalangist-Syrian dialogue is to take place on the basis of a working-paper to be submitted by the Phalangist Party. In the meantime, the two sides have expressed their positions and conditions on the dialogue and the following are the main points of the Syrian position towards this dialogue; some are conditions and some are concessions:

- 1) Through a statement by its Foreign Minister, Syria has expressed its willingness to open a dialogue with all sides in Lebanon.
- 2) Syria has also reportedly asserted that it was opposed to a military settlement of the Lebanese crisis and favoured a political settlement with the participation of all concerned parties.
- 3) Syria has demanded that an end be put to the campaign waged against it in the rightwing media.
- 4) Syria also demanded that Syrians and pro-Syrians detained by the Phalangists be released first.
- 5) Syria stressed the need for closing the "Israeli file" as far as the Lebanese Front is concerned.
- 6) Syria has agreed to establish special relations with Lebanon without written agreements.
- 7) Syria has expressed its determination to withdraw from downtown Beirut and from the mountains, in due time.
- 8) Syria has stressed that opposition to the Camp David accords is a national must and that these accords are harmful to Lebanon as well.

The Phalangist Position. The main points of the Phalangist position were the following:

- 1) The Phalangist Party agreed to accept the 14 national accord principles announced by President Elias Sarkis last month and withdrew its reservations on some points on condition that (a) the Arab character of Lebanon does not mean Islamization of the country; (b) that special relations with Syria do not entail written agreements, and (c) that support for the Palestinian resistance and cause does not mean acceptance of Palestinian re-settlement in Lebanon.
- 2) The Phalangist stressed that Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon is at the core of the Lebanese crisis and, since no Palestinian state is in

sight and no control can be imposed on the Palestinians, Syria must help settle this problem through its means.

3) The Phalangist want the Lebanese Army to replace the Syrian forces serving in the Arab Deterrent Force in all the positions that they will evacuate.

4) The Phalangists have repeatedly stated--in recent weeks--that the conflict with Syria was due to "misunderstanding", lack of trust and to mercenaries paid to sow discord.

5) The Phalangists are asking for the release of the remaining prisoners detained by the Syrians (8 Phalangists are still reported to be held in Syrian jails on charges of involvement in the June, 1978, Ehden massacre; their release depends on the settlement of the North Lebanon crisis that the Phalangists are reported to be in no hurry to settle at present).

6) The Phalangists also asked that Syria considers them as its interlocutor in Lebanon, in lieu of former President Suleiman Franjieh.

Reasons Behind The Syrian Move

The visit of Mr. Boutros to Damascus, the reception he was given, as well as the contacts that took place later on between the Lebanese State and Damascus and between the Phalangist Party and Damascus triggered a number of questions in view of the fact that relations had been rather strained for several months.

Informed sources told THE ARAB WORLD that when Syria first decided to improve its relations with the Lebanese State and received both Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros and Deuxième Bureau Chief Johnny Abdo, it was hoping to strengthen the Lebanese government and make it capable of implementing the Ba'itaddin resolutions and of helping Syria in certain fields. But it soon became clear to Syria that the Lebanese State was not in a position to put any pressure to bear on any party or organization in the country.

On the other hand, the assistance that Syria wanted from Lebanon was in the security field and it reportedly became clear to Syria that this was a field where the Lebanese Front, and in particular the Phalangists, could help. Because of their special direct and indirect links in Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere, they could provide the Syrian authorities with useful information. Syrian officials had more than once and publicly accused Phalangist of being involved with the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria and were hoping to put an end to this alleged involvement by resuming ties with this party.

On the other hand, Syria was reportedly keen on putting an end to the budding relationship which sprouted between the Lebanese Front and Iraq after a statement by Lebanese Front leader Camille Chamoun calling on the Iraqis to play a more effective role in Lebanon.

Furthermore, there was the problem of collaboration with Israel that Syria was keen to end, especially at this delicate stage of the Middle East talks and before the end of the self-rule negotiations and their yet unknown consequences.

The rapprochement between the Phalangists and the Syrian regime has triggered some concern in Lebanese leftist and in Palestinian circles, as well as among the followers of former President Suleiman Franjieh. The concern was reportedly about their future relations with Damascus should a full-fledged rapprochement take place between the Lebanese Front and the Syrian authorities. The Lebanese leftist National Movement this week despatched envoys to Damascus--including Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat--to review the situation and examine the possibility of reorganizing the internal structure of the National Movement in such a way as to include the Lebanese branch of the Syrian Baath Party on the Movement's political and executive committees. Informed sources however said that the membership of the Baath Party on this committee will not materialize in the near future.

Pending further developments, the Palestinian resistance has slowed down its rapprochement with the Lebanese State, just as the Lebanese Front has slowed down the settlement of the North Lebanon problem.

It is doubtful that Damascus would jeopardize its relations with any of the sides on the Lebanese scene but would rather try to improve relations with all of them together, for various purposes and in particular to reinforce its position domestically.

The forthcoming visit to Beirut of the Syrian Foreign Minister is expected to shed more light on the question. Contrary to what earlier reports had said, observers do not expect the Syrian official to meet with any of the Lebanese Front leaders during his one-day visit, but they expect that the outcome of his talks with President Sarkis will greatly affect the evolution of Damascus' relations with the Phalangist Party, especially if the Sarkis-Khaddam talks dwelt on the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from downtown Beirut and the formation of a politicians' cabinet in Lebanon.

CSO: 4820

TIES WITH IRAN EXAMINED, BASED ON RELIGION

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 19 May 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] Tehran--Iran and Lebanon have a deep rooted history of bilateral relations based on strong spiritual, religious and historical ties, said Lebanon Ambassador in Tehran Fouad Turk.

In an exclusive interview with the TEHRAN TIMES he said that one third of the Lebanese population (around one million) belonged to the Shiite Sect and added that this part of the population had brought the two countries nearer.

Several religious personalities of Lebanon received their education in Iran and several Iranian religious people are busy teaching Lebanese there, Turk said.

"This link," he said, "paved the way for a closer understanding between the peoples of the two countries."

Turk said that there were wide possibilities for bilateral economic and commercial relations between the two countries for which Lebanon's free economic and banking system provides unlimited opportunities.

On Irano-Arab relations Turk said, "I believe that the natural friends and allies of Iran are Arab countries and especially those who are neighbors."

He emphasized that differences between these countries should be thrashed out through mutual discussion.

Turk said that Lebanon has been a victim of international conspiracies engineered by Zionists and imperialists.

"Lebanon is a victim, for more than one reason, of world politics. We should review, though briefly, the factors that are closely connected in harming a people and homeland that do not deserve what is befalling them," Turk said.

"Lebanon is victim of abuse of the tenets of the United Nations Charter in the game of nations. It is victim of the failure of the International Community to reach a just solution, of a question it shared in creating. It is further victim of the exploitation of its unique structures and democratic regime," he reiterated.

"Lebanon is victim of Israel's usurpation of Arab territory in Palestine, of the dispersal of the people of Palestine and of the severe crisis which shakes the region as a result of this aggression," he added.

And furthermore he said: "It is a victim of the game of international balance in the Middle East, that game that detonated the crisis of our region, which in turn feeds this game. Active international currents are shaking Lebanon and threatening the coherence and unity of its people."

Lebanon he went on to explain was a victim of attempted partial solutions of the Middle East crisis. "We do not approve of these attempts, especially as they are set upon bases that do not take the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people into consideration, particularly this people's right in self determination on its land," he added.

Lebanon was again a victim of the existing contradictions in the Arab world to which it belongs, "those contradictions that exploded on our land is more than one form, let alone some devious irregular practices, which make of the Palestine cause a plea and pretext for exploitation, sometimes towards suspect aims that have nothing to do with restoring right to its rightful owners," he said.

Lebanon carries the burden of the presence of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians on its land, of the continued growth of this presence, and of the political doctrines of some as a result of what had befallen them, Turk said. It was unavoidable for these doctrines to clash with the State's philosophy and its future outlook, and with the views of more than one group. This created a situation which led to varied and grave irregularities that have repercussions on the country's unity and the authority of Government, he said.

He said further that Lebanon a victim of interference, in its internal affairs on the part of States and groups, the fact that constitutes a violation of the U.N. charter and of International Law, and a grave departure from sound principles and objectives.

Israel's policy of aggression on its land, especially on its South, and in particular that policy which is based on preventive attacks for political and military aims and designs that are completely rejected because they violate Lebanon's entity, territory and people, he said.

Lebanon's unequal structure, as a land on which more than one spiritual and confessional community meet, co-existing in perfect freedom, in accordance with an order that provides each one with an active role made it victim again he said. While this phenomenon was a source of human and national wealth, the events, guided by those who caused them, endeavoured to change it into a factor of dispute and dissension, he added.

Lebanon's espousal of a democratic liberal order, based on the consecration of man's fundamental rights, on respect of the individual, and on complete opening towards all citizens and peoples, since its emergence as a country with absolute sovereignty and full independence, is again cause of its victimization, he said.

More than one outside party made use of the merits of this order to infiltrate inside the ramparts and try, under the guise of freedom to demolish the entity of Lebanon through the demolition of its constituent elements, he explained.

Before alien hands were stretched to ill-use of Lebanon's destiny, "we were solving our problems in a spirit of cooperation, dialogue and reciprocal concessions under our democratic regime," he said. "Consequently, I can emphasize, in the light of the above, that Lebanon cannot be held responsible for all that has befallen it, unless the spirit to tolerance and opening towards others, cementing the feeling of brotherhood and mankind, generosity in conduct, belief in right and justice, solidarity with the oppressed, and the strong desire to safeguard the homeland's sovereignty and unity are defects resulting in political responsibility, so that Lebanon is the big victim, the principal victim of events in our region. It appears that the sister and friendly States and the International Organization are unaware of this, or are ignoring it. Beware of the developments and complications of Lebanon's tragedy as they may create a major question in the Middle East that will exceed and overshadow in its gravity and dimensions the Palestinian question," Turk added.

On Palestinian relations Turk said: "We believe it is a big injustice that Lebanon alone--and specially the suffering Shiite people of the South--bear the load of such a big problem like the Palestinian one which is an Arab responsibility as it is the responsibility of the whole International Community.

"The 'difference' in approach and attitude between the adverse effects of the armed Palestinian presence in our territory and our total commitment to the just cause of the Palestinian people and its right to return to its own land and to self determination.

"We are of course against any attempt attending the 'implantation' of the Palestinians on Lebanese soil.

"Lebanon is for the Lebanese (as Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh said during his last visit to our country), South Lebanon is for its Lebanese inhabitants, and Palestine is for the Palestinians.

Turk then proceeded to say it was obviously Lebanon's right to reject strange, novel proposals suggested from time to time, proposals which violate our sovereignty and dignity, and which contradict fundamental tenets of the international order. One of these proposals has been called "implantation," the implantation of the Palestinians in Lebanon, but Lebanon does not agree, and will never agree to implantation. Furthermore, the Palestinians themselves do not accept implantation nor is it possible for them to accept it. One cannot fail but note that all peace proposals for a solution of the Middle East problem, though they differ in several respects, agree on one common denominator, namely the implantation of the Palestinians in the States in which they now reside. "Sometimes this policy is clearly stated and sometimes it is alluded to in a hidden manner for deceptive purposes," he said.

"The affairs of States and of Peoples cannot be dealt with except in their natural contexts. Substitute contexts are artificial and cannot yield acceptable solutions. The Palestinian problem cannot be solved by creating a Lebanese problem. The problem of one dispersed people cannot be solved by dispersing another peaceful people. Starting a war in one place does not create peace in another. If the Palestinian problem is a matter of conscience lying so heavily on the conscience of the world, should one burden the conscience of the world further with new sins which bring in their wake new burdens and, perhaps, still more sins?" Turk passionately questioned.

On the question of an International Force in Lebanon he said that when acts of aggression recur in Southern Lebanon, whether directly or under cover, when the sovereignty of the State continues to be violated, and the International Force which has come to put an end to violation is, itself, faced with all sorts of attacks and provocations, respect for law as well as the prestige of International Organizations, require that this force be strengthened and equipped with new and effective means to enable the force to impose its authority and achieve its objective. The International Force, given the means at its disposal, has done its best to fulfill its objective, in spite of the many problems and dangers that face it. For this, it deserves our thanks and praise, he said.

"In our ancient history which spans over thousands of years, there are many pages of dark tragedies and radiant glories. Many are the times, over the ages when our shores and hills saw columns of invaders and usurpers. But all of whom went away as witnessed by inscriptions on rocks close to our capital town, leaving Lebanon in its eternal being.

"Armed by our own potential, and by its sacred right to live in freedom and dignity, the people of Lebanon are determined to safeguard its homeland, to defend its rights, and to drive back the imminent dangers and designs that threaten its unity, whichever side they come from," said Fouard Turk in conclusion.

SIX DECREES ISSUED TO EXPLAIN CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 57

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 15 Apr 80 p 3

[Article: "A Report to the Chairman of the Internal Constitutional Committee: The Committees Adopt Six Resolutions To Explain Article 57 of the Constitution"]

[Text] Yesterday the office of the parliament distributed the text of the report dealing with the legal circumstances surrounding the explanation of Constitutional Article 57, which deals with the president's right to ask the parliament to reconsider any law it issues.

It should be mentioned that in the final session to investigate this matter, held by the joint committees on 1 February, the chairman of the internal constitution committee, deputy Mikha'il al-Dahir, deputy Hasan al-Rifa'i, and lawyer Emile Bajjani were assigned to prepare a report explaining these cases which were the object of disagreement and constitutional differences of opinion, on the basis of the studies conducted by French jurist George Fidel and lawyer Emile Bajjani. Here is the text of the report drawn up by deputy al-Dahir.

The joint parliamentary committees representing the internal constitution committee, the administration and justice committee, and the office of the parliament held several meetings. The most important of these were the two held on 28 January and 1 February 1980, during which interpretive decisions regarding application of Article 57 of the Constitution, to be defined below, were discussed.

The first meeting was chaired by president of parliament, Kamil al-As'ad, with the following deputies attending: Munir Abu-Fadil, Mikha'il al-Dahir, Hasan al-Rifa'i, Mahmud 'Ammar, Nadim Na'im, Nasri al-Ma'luf, Bashir al-A'war, Dr Albert Mukhaybar, Shafiq Badr, Tariq Habashi, Katchik Babakiyan, Ra'if Samarah, Salih al-Khayr, parliamentary legal counselors Bisharah Manassa and Joe Tabit, and lawyer Emile Bajjani.

The second meeting was chaired by vice president of parliament, Munir Abu-Fadil, with the following deputies attending: Mikha'il al-Dahir, Katchik Babakiyan, Hasan al-Rifa'i, Mahmud 'Ammar, Shafiq Badr, Bashir al-A'war, Nasri al-Ma'luf, Fu'ad Lahud, Yusuf Hammud, legal counselors Bisharah Manassa and Joe Tabit, and lawyer Emile Bajjani.

After discussing the text of Article 57 of the Constitution and listening to five legal studies delivered according to [chronological] sequence by Edmond Rabat, Emile Bajjani, Joseph Zayn Shidyaq and Joe Tabit, as well as the advice of French legist George Fidel, the joint committees adopted the following resolutions which will be explained below.

The First Resolution

The phrase "the absolute majority" of all members of parliament means, in a legal sense, the majority figured on the basis of the number of living deputies, present or absent, without counting the deceased ones. At present, the absolute majority consists of 48 votes, since the number of deputies has become 94 (99 less 5) after the death of five deputies. This majority will not be figured on the basis of one-half plus one [which might be a fractional number], but on the basis of the whole [non-fractional] number which comes after one-half.

This resolution was based on an explanation of the text of the law as well as its rationale. With respect to explanation of the text, Article 57 speaks of the members who legally compose the parliament, and does not refer to the number of seats. The deceased are not considered members of parliament, and their seats are considered legally vacant, as opposed to absent or abstaining members, who still remain parliamentary members and occupy seats. Therefore, the word "legally" in Article 57 means that the majority comprises the present and absent members alike, without the deceased, the resigned or the dismissed.

With respect to the text's rationale and its democratic connotations, absence or abstention are both considered a position taken. Even a "no opinion" vote constitutes a position taken, while death results in no position or vote. Therefore, as has always been the case with the constitutional text which considers the number of members, i.e. the number of "occupied seats," it is not logical to include deceased members in figuring who constitutes the parliamentary representation of the country.

The Second Resolution

If on the basis of Article 57 of the Constitution, the president of the republic returns a law to parliament to be discussed a second time, and the parliament by an absolute majority insists on the law as it was passed on the basis of the first discussion, the president of the republic will be obliged to issue it.

The Third Resolution

If on the basis of Article 57 of the Constitution the president of the republic returns a law to parliament to be discussed a second time, and the parliament by a relative majority insists on the law as issued after the first discussion, the president of the republic is not obliged to issue it, but he can do so if he desires.

The Fourth Resolution

If on the basis of Article 57 of the Constitution, the president of the republic returns a law to the parliament to be discussed a second time, and the parliament agrees by an absolute majority to the reasons given by the president of the republic for its return, the president of the republic will be obliged to issue it.

The Fifth Resolution

If on the basis of Article 57 of the Constitution, the president returns a law to the parliament to be discussed a second time, and the parliament agrees by a relative majority to the reasons given by the president for its review, the president of the republic is not obliged to issue it, but he can do so if he desires.

In order to obtain positive results in the second, third, fourth and fifth situations mentioned above, the conferring members based their resolutions on the following legal considerations.

1. Article 57 of the Constitution entitles the president to (a) delay the promulgation of a law by requesting that it be reviewed again, or (b) refuse to issue the law if the parliament does not approve it by an absolute majority during the second discussion.
2. Article 57 deals with one case--the president's being forced to promulgate the law--from the standpoint of the president's executive powers (contained in Article 57 of Chapter Four, pertaining to executive powers). It says that he will be forced to promulgate the law only in case of an absolute majority; otherwise, the president is free not to promulgate it.
3. Article 57 does not regulate voting on the law during the second discussion, in the sense that the parliament must discuss the law and vote on it by an absolute majority. Rather, it provides only that the president be forced to issue the law if it receives an absolute majority. Here, "forcing" deals with the president, not with the voting on this law in itself. This voting has its own article which considers all cases and circumstances--Article 34 of the Constitution.
4. The president cannot be bound by reasons he expressed for requesting that the law be returned to parliament, if the parliament passes it with a relative majority, because Article 57 does not force the president to reveal these reasons or to promulgate the law except in one case--that of an absolute majority. Looking at it from another angle, the president can [not] be considered to have committed himself to the views he expressed, because persons with constitutional prerogatives do not have the right to agree in advance regarding exercise of these prerogatives, which are outside the scope of the concept of "contract" in its well-known civilian sense. Not to mention that changes in the country's general circumstances and conditions might force the president to adopt a new and different course.

Thus, it is not improper to restrict the lawfulness of his exercising his constitutional prerogatives in advance. However, there is nothing about this in the text of Article 57.

The Sixth Resolution

If on the basis of Article 57 of the Constitution, the president returns a law to the parliament, the parliament is entitled to pass any amendments or additions it feels necessary to the returned law, without being restricted by the reasons for its return. In this manner, the law in effect becomes a new law, entitling the president to request a review of it a second time.

This resolution was based on the text of Article 57, which grants the absolute right to demand the review of any legislative text. Inasmuch as the new additions and amendments constitute a new law, it is therefore subject to the possibility of the veto right provided for in Article 57. If it were otherwise, the text of this article would be totally invalid.

Summary

The decrees explained above are in accordance with the two studies prepared by French legist George Fidel and lawyer Emile Bajjani. They were adopted unanimously, except for the fifth and sixth resolutions, which were adopted by a majority. Besides that, there were the observations of deputy Hasan al-Rifa'i pertaining to the first resolution, along with his support for it.

8559

CSO: 4802

ARAB RECONSTRUCTION AID REPORTED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 2 Jun 80 p 4

[Text] Lebanon is to receive \$114 million shortly from Saudi Arabia to help finance post-war reconstruction, it was announced in Beirut last week. The money is one-fifth of Saudi Arabia's share of the \$2 billion which seven Arab states agreed to give Lebanon at a summit meeting in Tunis last November. The \$2 billion is to be paid in annual tranches over five years.

The announcement said Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz had informed Lebanese Premier Selim al-Hoss that instructions had been issued to pay the money to Lebanon following approval of Saudi Arabia's 1980 budget. Saudi Arabia is to provide the largest share--28.58 percent or \$571.6 million.

Kuwait and Libya each agreed to provide 15.71 percent of the fund (\$314.2 million each). Kuwait has informed the Lebanese government that payment of \$25 million had already been made and that the remainder of the \$62.84 million first annual tranche would be forthcoming later this year. The announcement added, however, that it appeared that Libya did not intend to pay its share of the fund. No reason was given.

Iraq has paid over \$40 million of the first tranche of \$58.64 million and intends to pay the rest during the second half of the year. Iraq agreed to provide a total of \$293.2 million or 14.66 percent of the fund. Iraq, according to some Arab sources, may also assume the 7.14 percent share of Algeria. Although Algeria agreed to provide Lebanon with \$142.8 million in tranches of \$28.56 million, Algeria's President Chadli Bendjedid told the Tunis summit that his country's own financial difficulties meant that the money could not be paid at present.

The UAE agreed to pay 11.63 percent of the fund for a total of \$232.6 million. The Lebanese government has been informed of payment in full of the 1980 tranche of \$46.52 million. Qatar agreed to provide a total of \$131.4 million, representing 6.57 percent of the reconstruction fund, but the announcement said Qatar's first tranche of \$26.38 had not yet been received. [as printed] Mr Hoss said the money from Arab states would be spent on projects approved by Lebanon's Development and Reconstruction Council for the next 12 months.

LOANS GRANTED TO TWO BANKS TO KEEP THEM OPERATING

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 20 Apr 80 p 6

[Article: "Two Loans Totalling 60 Million Pounds to the Industrial Development Bank and the Agricultural Credit Bank"]

[Text] At its last session, the cabinet approved two urgent bills intended to give the state's guarantee to two loans each worth 30 million Lebanese pounds, to be concluded between the Bank of Lebanon, the National Bank for Industrial and Tourism Development, and the Agricultural, Industrial and Real Estate Credit Bank.

Here is the text of the bill guaranteeing the loan to the Agricultural and Industrial Credit Bank, along with the reasons for it.

Article 1. It is permissible to grant the state's guarantee to the loan granted by the Bank of Lebanon, according to contract, to the Agricultural Industrial and Real Estate Credit Bank, amounting to 30 million pounds besides interest. The Finance Minister is authorized to sign this guarantee in the name of the state.

Article 2. The conditions of this loan, from the standpoint of duration, repayment, and calculation of interest, are defined in the contract, and the state's guarantee is considered tantamount to approval of the contents of the contract.

Article 3. The Finance Minister will determine by decree the bases and conditions for the Agricultural, Industrial and Real Estate Credit Bank's expenditure of this loan.

Article 4. This law will be effective immediately upon its publication in the official gazette.

Reasons for the Loan

With respect to the reasons for the loan, the bill said, "The Agricultural Industrial and Real Estate Credit Bank has continued functioning within the potentials available to it during the incidents which have buffeted the

country. It has recently become clear to the above-mentioned bank that all its material resources have been exhausted, and it can therefore no longer pursue its activities, having begun losing the necessary fluidity. Among all the reasons leading to this situation, there is the flock of loan requests and the borrowers' delinquency in repaying the instalments arranged at the time of the loan, so that the bank management has been forced to be lenient with them and help support the economic sectors during the trials through which the country is passing, in keeping with the state policy being followed in this respect, and embodying the special legislation issued for granting credit facilities for reconstructing the industrial, tourist and recovery sectors (Legislative Decree No 131 of 2 November 1977), and for revitalizing the economic sectors (Decree No 130 of 2 November 1977).

"Thus, the abovementioned credit bank finds itself in distress, and has determined not to stop functioning but to persist in carrying out its activities and pursuing its developmental activity by all possible means. Thus, it wants to ensure the necessary fluidity by means of a loan which it intends to contract with the Bank of Lebanon.

"This, in view of the state's relationship with the Agricultural, Industrial and Real Estate Credit Bank, is subject to discussion, since the state is considered one of the major shareholders in the bank's capital, and therefore it cannot abandon it in its current tribulations.

"In spite of the existence of a bank for housing credit, and another one for industrial and tourism development, the activity of this bank must be maintained, and there must be no attempt to eliminate its operations under the present circumstances.

"Therefore, the government has drawn up the accompanying urgent bill, which will be passed, it is hoped."

8559

CSU: 4802

CABINET APPROVES CHANGES IN UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR PAY REGULATIONS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 17 Apr 80 p 5

[Article: "Text of the Bill Amending Some University Regulations; A New Salary Scale and Additional Hours for Contract Professors"]

[Text] In its session yesterday, the cabinet approved the bill containing various rulings pertaining to some Lebanese University regulations.

The bill deals with a number of matters, including incorporating the higher education allowance into the base salary, and entitling tenured or contract professors to be compensated for additional hours of instruction in excess of the upper limit provided for in the contract law, on condition that the total not exceed 100 hours a year.

The text of the bill is as follows.

Article 1. As of 1 January 1980, the higher education allowance provided for in Article 11 of Law 70/6 of 23 February 1970 shall be incorporated into the base salary, and the salary scale for faculty members will become as shown in the attached table.

Article 2. The additional allowance provided for in Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of Law 70/6 of 23 February 1970 shall remain in effect, and shall not be figured into the compensation provided for in Article 27 of Legislative Decree No 112 of 12 June 1959.

The rulings of this article do not apply to contract faculty members of the College of Engineering.

Article 3. Contract faculty members at the Lebanese University, when appointed to permanent tenure, shall retain the seniority qualifying them for advancement.

Article 4. Tenured or contract faculty members teaching in the field of their specialization, after fulfilling the maximum number of hours of instruction or the required research, are entitled to compensation for additional hours of instruction over and above the maximum, on condition that the total not exceed 100 hours a year.

The university board shall specify the maximum referred to in the previous paragraph, and shall stipulate that this limit be no less than 10 hours of instruction a week, on the basis of a minimum of 26 weeks of instruction for the university year. The board will also set the minimum number of teaching hours required of faculty members, and shall stipulate that this be no less than 6 hours a week.

Article 5. Lebanese University faculty members who have permanent tenure or contracts are entitled to compensation for supervising and correcting written examinations, and conducting oral and practical exams, whether these are examinations the results of which are entered into the final results of the exams conducted by the university or are competitive exams.

The compensation referred to in the previous paragraph shall not be entered into the calculation of compensation provided for in Article 27 of Legislative Decree No 112 of June 1959.

Article 6. Deans of university units shall be exempted from teaching duties, and if they teach they shall receive no compensation for it.

Directors of branches who have permanent tenure or who are contract professors shall be exempt from the number of teaching hours set by the university board, and shall receive no compensation for the remaining teaching hours.

Branch directors shall be paid a departmental compensation equivalent to 25 percent of the base salary, as of 1 July 1979.

Article 7. On the basis of a proposal made by the specialized units, the board of the Lebanese University shall approve the semester system in these units, and shall allocate a portion of the vacation days, including the summer vacation, for various academic activities.

Under the circumstances referred to in the preceding paragraph, the university board shall determine the details for applying the approved system or the adopted decisions, the number of examination courses, and how they are to be conducted.

Article 8. Some university units will be permitted to adopt their own system suitable to their work requirements, their conditions of appointment and their circumstances.

The systems referred to in the previous paragraph shall be determined by cabinet decree on the basis of a proposal by the Minister of National Education and Fine Arts, on the basis of the university board's recommendation or approval.

Article 9. There shall be established, at the Lebanese University's central administration, four new authorities in addition to the university secretariat and the joint administrative authority established according to Law No 6/75 of 26 December 1967, as follows: the Financial Affairs Authority,

the Equipment and Logistics Authority, the Cultural and Student Affairs Authority, and the Administrative Inspection Authority. All these authorities shall be regulated, their tasks and staff requirement defined, and the departments and sections redistributed among them by decree, on the basis of a proposal by the Minister of National Education and Fine Arts, based on a request by the Lebanese University's board and on cabinet approval.

Table Showing the Changes in Salaries of Lebanese University Professors

Old Salary	New Salary
1,080	1,650
1,150	1,750
1,220	1,850
1,320	2,000
1,420	2,150
1,520	2,300
1,620	2,450
1,720	2,600
1,855	2,800
1,990	3,000
2,125	3,200
2,260	3,400
2,395	3,600
2,530	3,800
2,665	4,000
2,800	4,200
2,935	4,400
3,070	4,600
3,205	4,800
3,340	5,000
3,475	5,200
3,610	5,400
3,745	5,600
3,880	5,800
4,015	6,000

8559

CSO: 4802

CHAIRMAN OF ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY INTERVIEWED

Beirut MONDAY MORNING In English 19-25 May 80 pp 16-23

[Text]

The good news: there will be no power rationing in Lebanon this summer, even if consumption takes a 25 percent leap upward.

The bad news: electricity rates will be taking their own leap in the near future, rising by around 40 percent.

Electricity Authority (*Electricité du Liban*) Chairman Fuad Bizri told *Monday Morning* in a private interview: "Seven or eight months ago, we agreed on a price revision formula which gave the Authority the right to raise electricity rate by 40 percent. Unfortunately, however, we were not allowed to impose the increase immediately. In view of what was happening in the country, the State asked us to delay the measure..."

The delay is approaching its end, however. "and I think the increase will be approved soon," Bizri said, adding that higher power rates were not only justified but essential.

"At the present time, we don't even cover our working expenses, not to mention the huge expense of development to meet future needs," he said. "The cost of material has quintupled over the past 10 years. The cost of labor has tripled since 1974. In addition, our current seven year plan for the purchase of new equipment will cost LL. 1,550,000,000 at

present prices. Right now, we're meeting the cost by taking loans from international sources — the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, Arab banks, Arab developments funds — through the Reconstruction and Development Board. But these loans have to be paid back over 15 or 20 years, with interest. Since in the final analysis, it's the

Lebanese people who will pay them back, it is only fair that those who use more electricity should pay more than those who use less."

Hence the imminent increase in electricity rates.

Higher electricity bills, Bizri said, are also essential as part of a nonexistent but urgently needed "intelligent energy policy."

An intelligent energy policy, as seen by Lebanon's power chief, would include the following:

MAXIMUM REDUCTION OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION:

"Electricity is one of the most expensive forms of energy. The people must be made to realize that electricity in Lebanon is being generated to meet specific needs and must not be used as a substitute when there is a shortage of other forms of energy. To heat a room in

your house, the Electricity Authority has to burn triple the amount of fuel you would have to burn if you were to heat it with butane or gas oil directly. The same applies to cooking and the heating of water. It is an unwarranted waste.

"We make our development plans to meet the power needs of the people in specific areas where there is no alternative to electricity. I'm talking about lights, home appliances, air conditioning, etc. But certainly not home — heating, water heating and cooking. If half of the population were to switch to cooking by electricity and each family were to buy just one two burner stove, electricity consumption in Lebanon would double at noon, and we would not be able to meet that demand. We would have to start rationing. We can meet the normal increase in demand, but we cannot perform miracles, and with the price of fuel rising so steeply, we shouldn't be asked to. Lebanon does not have the right to use electricity as a substitute for other, cheaper forms of energy.

"It is up to the State to drive this point home to the people, and it must do so not only through information campaigns but also through a price policy which reflects the real value of electricity. Waste must stop."

MAXIMUM AVAILABILITY OF PRIMARY FUELS:

Bizri noted that last winter, power consumption in Lebanon registered an incredible 25 percent increase. Major cause: shortage of butane gas and gas oil, which made it impossible for people to heat their homes with gas heaters or central heating systems and forced them to turn to electric heaters. Although the fuel shortage is over, Bizri said, the 25 percent increase in power consumption has been maintained.

Bizri stressed that Lebanon's energy policy must take into consideration the need to avert fuel shortages which would overburden the country's electricity system. Here's how:

- "If we risk shortages in butane gas because some suppliers and distributors are ill-intentioned, the State must take over the entire butane operation, importation, bottling and distribution. Why not? The State took over the electricity system, didn't it? If it cannot control the malpractices of butane importers and distributors, why shouldn't it take the matter into its own hands? Malpractices in the butane supply system can have grave consequences. If the people don't have butane, they turn to electric heaters and cookers. They may be ruining the State, but as far as they're concerned, they need energy: if they can't get it in one form, they'll get it in another."

- The importation of petroleum products must be reorganized to avoid a disruption of supplies. "We are an importing country, and we must make sure that when the flow of oil imports is interrupted for one reason or another — difficulties in maritime or land transport, for instance — we will not suffer a shortage. To do this, we must build up our fuel stocks, and for that we need increased storage capacity."

MORE USE OF CHEAPER FUELS:

- Instead of importing gas oil or light crude, Lebanon should import heavy crude, which is available at lower prices and can still be used in the country's power plants. The importation of heavy crude requires special unloading and storage equipment which Lebanon does

not have and must acquire as soon as possible.

- "Because we don't have large industries, all Lebanese factories depend on electricity for energy. Primary fuel is used only in transportation — cars and buses, which use only gasoline. Lebanon, which is now impoverished, must think in terms of switching from gasoline to fuel oil (diesel engines) for road vehicles. Diesel engines were outlawed in Lebanon

at one point, because it was considered that fuel oil is more of a pollutant than gasoline: it releases more smoke and a sharper smell. In reality, well-adjusted diesel engines release less smoke and fumes, and are less harmful, than gasoline engines. Lebanon can no longer afford to say 'gasoline only.' It's a waste."

EXPANSION OF REFINING CAPACITY

With the price of petroleum products soaring, Lebanon must:

- Expand the capacity of its two existing refineries in Tripoli, North Lebanon, and Zahrani, South Lebanon. "This is perfectly feasible. It can be done without great expense. It must be done immediately."

- Construct a large third refinery in cooperation with Saudi Arabia - a project which began to be discussed in 1968. "We must have that refinery if we are to meet present and future demand for oil products in Lebanon. Our demand now is relatively limited, of course, but the construction of a third refinery would serve the double purpose of making Lebanon's oil products competitive and promoting the rise of petrochemical industries, which can absorb a large proportion of the work force."

INITIATION OF OIL EXPLORATION:

"Lebanon so far has not undertaken a serious systematic oil exploration program. Some people have obtained licenses and have done some drilling, but that is not enough. If Jordan and Israel are continuing to drill for oil, with some success, there is no reason why the Lebanese State should not launch an oil exploration program itself, on Lebanese territory and in Lebanese territorial waters."

Summing up his dim view of the Lebanese authorities' approach to energy problems, Bizri said: "It is abnormal for

the Lebanese State to have no energy policy at all. Petroleum products are becoming more scarce, and we are importing oil in ever increasing quantities. If the energy situation remains in its present state of anarchy, if the authorities do not give this problem the attention it deserves, the effects on the State's finances are bound to be ruinous."

In his own part of the energy scene, Bizri is trying, within the existing limitations, to keep anarchy at bay.

Last summer caught the Electricity Authority with its pants down: development work had been delayed by the "events" (Lebanon's umbrella term for the 1975-76 war and the 1978 clashes between the rightist militias and the Syrian troops of the Arab Deterrent Forces), allowing demand to outstrip thermal power production. A dry winter compounded the problem by virtually halving the country's hydraulic power production capacity. The result was an overall 20 percent shortfall in available power. Syria came to the rescue, sending enough power supplies across the border to cut the shortage down to 12 percent.

That eased the problem, but it did not solve it, and the Electricity Authority was forced to resort to power rationing.

Since then, Bizri's team has been busy:

NEW GENERATORS

Four gas-turbine generators which were out of commission last summer have been repaired and can provide a total of 100,000 kilowatts during the summer season.

Two additional gas turbines have just been put into operation, adding another 40,000 kilowatts.

The 140,000 extra kilowatts represent an increase of 36 percent over the thermal power that was available in Lebanon last summer.

Two more 1980 blessings.

● *An unusually wet winter to offset last year's drought.* Between January and May, 1979, the hydraulic power stations in Lebanon produced 177 million kilowatt/hours. In the same period this year, they yielded 325 million kilowatt hours.

Bizri expects to get twice as much water generated electricity this summer as he did in the hot months of 1979.

"Taking that and the six extra thermal generators into consideration, we should have 45 percent more electricity this summer than we did last summer," he said.

● *A new gas-turbine generator, scheduled to go on stream in the Jiyeh power plant this summer — hopefully in August.* The unit, which has been under construction for two years, will have a 70,000 kilowatt capacity.

SUMMER POWER

Last summer (July, August, September), Lebanon needed a total of 42 million kilowatt/hours per week (although it did not get it). Under normal circumstances, the demand for electricity increases by 10-12 percent annually in Lebanon. If this norm holds in 1980 Lebanon will need 47 million kilowatt hours per week this summer — and that the Electricity Authority can provide without any trouble, keeping over 10 percent in reserve.

The problem is that the 12 percent-increase rule has been broken this year. The shortage of butane and gas oil in winter introduced the use of lines are concerned, an international tender is expected in three months' time. If all goes according to plan, the bids will be in before the end of this year and work on the project should start in March/April, 1981.

"I hope to have the two stations and

sea lines ready by the end of summer, 1981," Bizri said.

He also hopes to win his battle with anarchy on two other fronts: the theft and voltage fronts.

POWER THIEVES

Power theft, a phenomenon spawned

by the Lebanese war, has been draining the resources of the Electricity Authority for years and playing havoc with its power demand projections. Citizens of various walks of life in all parts of Lebanon, taking advantage of the near-total lack of law enforcement, have been hooking into the power lines and drawing electricity for their homes, shops and offices without so much as a by-your-leave to the *Electricité du Liban*. Power substations in several regions, overloaded by the activities of the power pirates, have been burning out; the slim electricity reserves have been dwindling; and the Electricity Authority, already in financial straits because of what it regards as "abnormally low" electricity rates, has been watching thousands of people helping themselves to precious energy free of charge.

The Authority started a campaign against the power thieves last year. It tried public appeals first, issuing statement after statement designed to "shake the conscience" of the people concerned. When that didn't work, the Authority resorted to public pressure: when a power station burned out because of the power robbery, it was left unrepaired for a long period, building up public anger against the thieves. And when that didn't work, the Authority tried the strong-arm approach: teams of technicians, backed by Internal Security Force units, began traveling around Beirut and other parts of the country, bringing down the pirate lines and serving warnings to their owners. Some of the free-loaders opted in favor of law and order and became regular

subscribers. Others waited until the ISF units were out of sight and put their lines up again.

"Our energy loss because of power theft remains in the range of 11 to 12 percent, which is a huge proportion," Bizri said, "but the thefts are gradually decreasing. We are still doing our best to electricity for heating and cooking, and judging by the fact that the end of the shortage has not brought power consumption down, the use of electricity for cooking and water-heating has become a habit. Between January and May, 1979, Lebanon needed 603 million kilowatt hours. During the same period in 1980, it needed 757 million kilowatt hours — a 25 percent increase.

If the trend continues, Lebanon is likely to need 52 to 53 million kilowatt/hours per week this summer — 25 percent more than it did in Summer 1979.

"I don't say that we can't meet that kind of demand," Bizri told me. "We can do it by using our reserves. We will have no problem supplying power this year, and even next year. There is no immediate danger of a return to rationing, but as you know, it takes around five years to build a new power station. If the demand continues to rise at the rate of 25 percent per annum, the time will come when we will not be able to cope — if not this year, then next year, and if not next year, then the year after. It's a matter of how fast we can increase our

power generation capacity, and our programs are now based on the premise that the demand in Lebanon rises at the rate of 10 to 12 percent per annum."

To meet this "normal" increase in demand in the 1980's, the Electricity Authority is pressing ahead with its current LL. 1.5 billion seven-year development plan, which started in 1977.

FUTURE PROJECTS

On the program:

- *Two additional steam turbines in the Jiyeh plant, currently being installed, scheduled to start operating in 1981, delivering 140,000 kilowatts.* Those units, along with the one which is expected to be ready in August this year, will cost a total of LL. 300 million.

- *A new LL. 500 million power plant in Zouk.* The two-unit, 300,000-kilowatt facility is expected to be ordered "before July" and will be ready in four years' time.

- *A new power plant in Batroun, containing five units, each with a 150,000-kilowatt capacity.* The land is now being expropriated. The plant will be ordered in 1981 and it will be ready in

1985.

- *A major substation for exchange of power supplies between Lebanon and Syria* will be completed near the North Lebanon town of Zghorta by the end of this year.

In the meantime, the Electricity Authority, which suffered a great deal from fuel shortages due to erratic overland transportation conditions in Lebanon last year, is working on a project to guarantee a constant supply of fuel for the country's two major existing power plants: Jiyeh and Zouk.

Two offshore fuel stations will be set up in the Zouk and Jiyeh areas, around 1,500 meters away from the coast. Each station will have anchoring facilities for 40,000 ton tankers which can unload their fuel there. The fuel will be pumped through "sea lines" to special reservoirs to be constructed close to the Jiyeh and Zouk plants.

The reservoirs are now under construction — two near the Jiyeh plant with a total capacity of 30 million liters, and two near the Zouk plant, with a total capacity of 40 million liters.

Where the maritime stations and sea

put a stop to them, and we hope that the job will become easier as security conditions improve."

When security conditions improve and the merchants and businessmen of Beirut return to the capital's now deserted commercial center, they will find that the voltage in that area — up to the Fuad Chehab overpass and the Quarantine quarter — has been switched from 110 to 220.

VOLTAGE SWITCH

"Because of the great advantages of 220-volt electricity, we are gradually changing the voltage in all parts of Lebanon," Bizri said. "The process has to be gradual. We made the switch in the commercial center of Beirut after the last round of fighting. In other parts of the capital, every new building that goes up is getting 220-volt electricity, and sometimes, we seize the opportunity to switch the voltage of surrounding buildings.

"But the focus of our activities in this matter is now on areas which are not so densely populated and are expanding rapidly — the suburbs of the capital, for instance. Those suburbs now all have 220-volt electricity."

Whatever the voltage, the important thing for the Lebanese people, who have had a bellyful of candlelight and stationary elevators over the past five years, is that they will be getting some form of electricity around the clock (give or take a few maintenance interruptions) this summer.

The promise of summer-long power will even, perhaps, make the approaching 40 percent electricity rate hike easier to swallow.

But that is a big perhaps.

BRIEFS

CAMPAIGN OF ARRESTS--London--A crazy centralized campaign to arrest all nationalist elements and educated Libyans undertaken by Qadhdhafi's terrorist squads has been launched in all regions of the country. It has lead them off to Qadhdhafi's dungeons and the inquest into their political views and attitudes about the repressive ruling authority has been applied to them with the most hateful and violent means. Among those who were recently arrested were: Muhamad Faraj Hami; Mustafa al-Shaybani; Muhammad Hilal; 'Ali al-Lafi; Farid Husayn Ashra; Ramadan Bu Khayt 'Abd-al-'Ati Ahdash; Muhammad Muhalhal; Muhammad al-Zulaytini; Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid Babur; Muhammad al-Sukar; Mahmud Bu 'Abid; Bashir bin Kurrah. [Excerpts] [London SAWT LIBYA in Arabic April 80 p 21]

CSO: 4802

MEANING OF CONSULTATION IN GOVERNMENT DISCUSSED

Riyadh AL-RIYADH in Arabic 19 Mar 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Consultation and a System of Trust"]

[Text] In light of the circumstances which our Arab and Islamic world is experiencing, the political direction [taken by a government] is a link which is connected to events and positions taken as well as to everything that these events involve in the way of developments which are based on economic and strategic interests.

The Saudi government--as usual, and without any uproar or haste--has come out against excesses in the creation of unrealistic innovations which involve the adoption of principles and frameworks of government which deviate from the heart and soul of Islamic law and from the reality of our moral conduct and customs.

The movement toward the formulation of a system of authority, a system of consultation, and a system of provincial administration, is an event which is being anticipated by all the people of our country. This is because--in comparison with what we see around us in terms of political systems which have been imported or are characterized by subordination, or semi-subordination, to the dictatorship of a single party or to a particular organization's change and development in Saudi Arabia usually originate from sources of power which are positive and do not make our citizens feel that they are being ruled by high and distant authorities.

In our country we have become used to the fact that there are no barriers between the highest man in government and the humblest citizen from the desert, when it is a matter of expressing his opinion and discussing and bringing up his demands. This is because basically there are no restrictions, barriers, and guards. This is why public safety and security in this country have become a topic of world-wide discussion and controversy.

The number of crimes committed in this country is very low when compared with any country only a fourth as large. This has made even non-citizens in Saudi Arabia conduct themselves in such a way as to show respect for our system--not because they fear it, but because it is a system which takes action, practices its beliefs, and possesses traditions which are based on rights and are prescribed by our True Faith.

This is why we are saying that the requirements of modern times have made the government turn its attention to these systems [of authority, consultation, and provincial administration], not only for the sake of change and development, but also because of the positive nature of our present situation which has made the government feel that [a sound] inner structure is equivalent to a strong foundation and that our citizens have become adequately perceptive and alert to protect their existence and their country.

Since the system of Shura [consultative government] has its origin in the Qiblanas Kur'anic verse "And order them to consult among themselves," we are trying, in this modern age, to put into practice the Islamic concept of government in this sacred land, the cradle of the Noble Prophecy.

The meaning of these systems [of authority, consultation, and provincial administration], and the form and nature which they will take, will demonstrate the fact that a government which builds housing projects, hospitals, universities and schools, is a government which can build a system of ethical, religious and national institutions, and is acting accordingly with full confidence, in the midst of a hectic world in turmoil.

Our religion has great precepts which enable it to coexist with the modern age, with all of its political developments and social forms. As our government lays the preliminary framework for the three systems [of authority, consultation, and provincial administration], it is striding toward the modern age with complete confidence and stability, because the feeling of our citizens toward this government is one of love free of arrogance or hypocrisy. This is something which all of our enemies are not aware of.

END

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INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND FOCUSES ON HUMAN RESOURCES

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 29 Mar 80 pp 3, 15

[Article: "In the Industrial Development Fund's Report About Last Year: 19 Million Riyals for the Development of Energy Production Capabilities"]

[Text] The Fund undertakes its responsibility toward the development of human resources in the Kingdom. The Fund participates in the production of building materials in order to slow down inflation. Sixty-six companies in the field of electric power have made use of loans from the Fund. The Fund's commitments began with a figure of 150 million, and after 4 years they totalled 2 billion.

Riyadh--Saudi News Agency--Shaykh muhammad Aba al-Khayl, the minister of finance and national economy, declared that the sector of industry in the Kingdom has gone through a period of tremendous expansion and development during the last few years. During this time, an effective role was played by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund in raising the Saudi people's standard of living and creating a new industrial society.

In a speech in which he introduced the Fund's annual report for the fiscal year 1398-1399 A.H. [1978-1979 A.D.], the minister said that the fund has participated in supporting industry by means of loans with easy terms. He added that the fund is shouldering the responsibility of administering the government program which deals with long-term loans to national electric power production companies, and that this program has also led to a tremendous increase in the production and distribution of electric power.

Minister Aba-al-Khayl expressed the hope that the fund will have new opportunities to complete the job it started on strong foundations.

Since its founding in 1394 A.H. [1974 A.D.], the Industrial Development Fund has had the honor of playing an effective role in the tremendous development which the kingdom has witnessed, especially since the beginning of the second five-year plan which began in the year 1395 A.H. [1975 A.D.]. During the first 5 years, the fund approved 507 loans for new industrial projects and for expansion in other projects. The number of projects which made use of

financing through the fund as 467, and the total [financial] commitments made by the fund during the 5 years amounted to 3.5 billion riyals. The amount spent so far has been 3.4 billion riyals.

In the field of electric power, the report stated that the fund offered 233 loans totalling a value of 16.5 billion riyals. Eighty-four electric power companies took advantage of them and the total payments to the electric power sector have now reached a figure of 12.6 billion riyals.

During the year 1398 A.H. [1978 A.D.], the Industrial Development Fund approved loans whose financial commitments totalled 6.7 billion riyals. And 111 new projects have been approved, for which financial commitments total 987 million riyals. The electric power companies have received 48 new loans, totalling 5.8 billion riyals. During the [fiscal] year 1398-1399 A.H. [1978-1979 A.D.] the fund's newly authorized loan payments reached a record figure, which was 7.6 billion riyals, of which the industrial sector received 1.1 billion riyals and the electric power companies received 6.5 billion riyals.

Some of the original borrowers have begun to pay back their loans, and it is expected that the volume of payments during the next few years will increase. This will lead to the availability of new amounts of money which the fund will be able to loan out in order to support industrial projects in the future.

In addition to providing loans, the Industrial Development Fund is continuing to offer its advisory services to Saudi businessmen and to their foreign partners in different fields.

The fund always assumes its responsibility toward the development of human resources in the kingdom. By doing this, it is confident that it will be possible to develop an effective industrial sector without having to rely on foreign labor in the long run. By means of its training programs, it is helping to teach [Saudi] employees the various skills needed for the kingdom's industrial and electrical power projects.

In its sixth year of its existence, the Industrial Development Fund is able to participate, on a large scale, in many sectors of production, especially in the industrialization of agricultural production, the food industries, the chemical industries, and the plastic industry. It is doing this by means of working together with the petrochemical industries. The fund also looks forward to strong and effective participation in the private industrial sector in order to make use of opportunities which are expected in the future.

It is also expected that the fund will undertake unprecedented financing operations in the area of electric power in order to deal with the growing demand for electricity in the future. The Fund's report mentioned that in view of the unexpectedly strong demand on the part of the private sector for [loans from] the Fund, it was decided several times to increase the [Fund's amount of] capital. This level has presently reached 5 billion riyals.

The Industrial Development Fund has had to deal with a special situation in the realm of industrial development since the tremendous increase in oil profits has led to a tremendous expansion in the demand for industrial products of different kinds.

The fund has responded to this challenge by supporting the private sector by means of guaranteeing huge loans, such that the fund's financial commitments in its first year totalled 150 million riyals, then this figure went up to a billion riyals in the second year, and then finally reached its peak in the fourth year when it was more than 2 billion riyals.

The report stated that one of the main achievements by the fund has been the way it has dealt with the great need for building materials which resulted from the tremendous demand for construction projects during the last few years. By means of its intensive financing program, the fund has helped to start a number of projects for producing building materials, thereby contributing toward the lowering of construction costs and combatting inflation.

The report mentioned that the Industrial Development Fund, during the fiscal year which ended in the month of Jumada al-Thaniyah in the year 1399 A.H. [1979 A.D.], received 148 new requests for industrial loans, that is, an average of 12 requests per month. Eleven of the requests have already been approved. They involve financial commitments totalling 972 million riyals. This brings the total number of loans approved up to 507, and the number of industrial projects which have been financed is 467.

During the five-year period, the fund's total [financial] commitments to industrial projects equalled 5.5 billion riyals, and the total of this which has been spent is 3.4 billion riyals.

In the middle of the year 1395 A.H. [1975 A.D.], the fund undertook to establish an administrative financial body for the electric power companies in order to support the programs of electrification in the kingdom.

This administrative board is entrusted with the job of administering special allocations from the government for the purpose of developing national electric companies in order to help them construct and develop power production installations. At the present time these allocations total more than 19 billion riyals.

The administrative financial board of the electric power companies is working together with the ministry of industry and electric power and other government offices in the planning and implementation of electrification programs in the Kingdom.

The report stated that the fiscal year 1398 A.H. [1978 A.D.] witnessed great expansion in financing operations and technical aid which was offered to private electric power companies. The fund approved loans totalling 5.8 billion riyals, and the fund's total financial commitments to this sector

were 16.85 billion riyals. So far 233 loans have been approved for the development of electric power, and these loans are currently being utilized by a total of 66 companies which originally numbered 84 companies, and then underwent unification and merging.

Payments by the fund to the electric power companies reached a record figure in the [fiscal] year 1398-1399 A.H. [1978-1979 A.D.]. They were more than 6.5 billion riyals. This brings the total amount spent by electric power companies to 12.6 billion riyals. Also, a total of 6 billion riyals from the financial commitments to the electric power sector has been earmarked for power generating projects while 8.8 billion riyals have been earmarked for [electric power line] distribution and delivery networks. And 1.7 billion riyals have been earmarked for building construction and for other projects. In the field of consultant services, the fund offers consultant services in various fields of activity to those who take out loans from it, both during the construction phase of projects which it has approved and when these projects are put into actual operation.

The Industrial Development Fund follows up on a project during the stages of its construction, operation, and repair and maintenance. This is done in order to make sure that the industrial and electric power projects maintain an appropriate level and quality [of work]. The fund also audits the book-keeping and watches production and sales figures for the purpose of anticipating marketing problems.

As for industrial production, the report states that the Fund has financed a great many of the investments in the private industry sector during the last few years. The total amounts invested in the industrial sector during the [fiscal] year 1396-1397 A.H. [1976-1977 A.D.] have been estimated at about 1.3 billion riyals. The fund's share of this was 704 million riyals, that is, more than half of the total figure.

The projects financed by the fund are noted for their enormous scope. The average project costs 9 million riyals, and the average number of persons working [in each project] is 80. Projects which are financed by the fund provide a production increase which totals 166,000 riyals for each person working [in these projects]. This is three times as much production in this sector as there was in the [fiscal] year 1396-1397 A.H. [1976-1977 A.D.]. Based on estimates made by the fund, the projects which it is financing, when they reach full productive capacity, will add to the national income a total of about 5.4 billion riyals. This is a figure which is far greater than the total production figure was for production in the non-petroleum industrial sector before the establishment of the Fund.

The report of the Industrial Development Fund made it clear that in view of the scarcity of native labor in industry and the need to import workers from foreign countries for many of the industrial projects, the fund has decided to pursue a special strategy for the encouragement of industries which do not require a large number of workers.

In view of the nature of the fund's work, it is constantly in contact with foreign companies which are looking for opportunities to be active in the kingdom. It is prepared, on request, to offer advice to Saudi industrialists concerning the appropriateness of any joint project which they are about to engage in setting up together with foreign companies.

Companies which have been created having joint liability with Saudi or foreign companies have the right to avail themselves of the fund's financing, according to laws concerning the investment of foreign capital. The condition is that the Saudi partner's share be at least 25 percent, and the fund will give preference to projects in which the Saudi share is at least 50 percent. The Fund encourages Saudi shareholders to share in the ownership of the project. So far the Fund has financed 110 joint projects, that is, the equivalent of 24 percent of all of the projects which it finances. Total [financial] commitments for joint projects have reached a figure of 1.6 billion riyals, and this equals 31 percent of the fund's total [commitments].

As for the Fund's participation in the development of the construction industry, the report mentioned that the Fund, at the beginning of the year 1396 A.H. [1976 A.D.], initiated the implementation of a principal program for approving projects which involve the production of building materials. An indication of the fund's influence in what happened with the prices of these materials, in addition to its clear effect on the cost of housing, was the decrease in the official index of housing costs by about 10 percent in the third quarter [of the fiscal year] 1396-1397 A.H. [1976-1977 A.D.].

The fund is continuing to finance new projects for the production of [building] materials in order to deal with the requirements of the construction industry sector which, in the meantime, has acquired more and more experience and technical expertise. Right now there is taking place the production of pre-mixed reinforced cement and prefabricated buildings in order to deal with the demand for world-wide uniformity of criteria and quality in order to facilitate [building] construction, especially in the area of building government buildings.

Concerning the cement industry, the fund participates in this field also. So far it has financed principal expansion operations in 2 of the existing 3 plants, and it has approved loans for the construction of 2 new plants, 1 in Yanbu', and the other in al-Qasim. Total [financial] commitments by the fund to the cement industry are 1.2 billion [riyals], and the fund currently is undertaking a study of 2 other projects and also expects to receive other requests for the financing of new projects.

As for the fund's participation in the food industry and consumer goods industries, the report states that the Industrial Development Fund has undertaken to finance projects having to do with the production of dairy products, bread products, canned meats, prepared foods, and plants which produce ice, carbonated drinks, and canned mineral water.

The fund also participates in [financing] plants which produce textiles, furniture, electrical appliances, and paper goods. The number of projects [concerning the production of] consumer goods which the fund has financed is 96, and the total in loans committed [to these areas] is 830 million riyals.

In the area of plastic and chemical industries, the fund has continued to increase and expand the scope of its loans in this sector. Total commitments made by the fund to chemical industry projects have amounted to 781 million riyals, and 82 projects have amounted to 781 million riyals, and 82 projects have made use of these loans.

The products of projects which are financed by the fund also include industrial and chemical gases which are utilized in oil fields and in [the production of] insecticides. One of the most important developments anticipated in this field is the petrochemical industries' project "Sabik" which will provide the raw materials that are [currently] being imported. The report referred to the fund's participation and activity in the field of the electrification of the Kingdom. It stated that, with the support of the fund, electricity has been brought to 581,000 homes and 64,000 non-residential commercial offices, whereas at the end of the year 1395 A.H. [1975 A.D.] 303,000 homes and 36,000 other units [had electricity].

The fund's program of loans will provide for electric power generation totalling 6,400 megawatts during the next 5 years. Power generated will increase from about 3,300 megawatts in the year 1398 A.H. [1978 A.D.] to 9,700 megawatts in the year 1403 A.H. [1983 A.D.]. This will be accompanied by expansion in [power] transmission and distribution.

The fund's financing of the change of the western region's electrical systems over to an electrical system with higher capacity represents considerable progress in the field of electrical power since it will then be possible to install large units of higher effectiveness and with more power capacity. This will guarantee safety with the equipment and will guarantee that the equipment can be relied upon. In addition to this, it will be possible to merge this electrical power with the power which is generated by means of the public water purification plants.

The report pointed out some examples of electrical power projects which have been financed by the fund. Among them are [the project of] al-Ghizlan in the eastern region; the new power generating station in Riyadh, which has a capacity of 500 megawatts; the development of a 110 kilovolt transformer network for Jiddah, Mecca, and al-Ta'if; the construction of a 380 kilovolt transformer system for the water purification plant in Yanbu'; and a project for setting up electronic computer centers in Riyadh, Jiddah, Mecca, Medina and in the eastern region.

As for the Industrial Development Fund's role in the development of the rural areas, the report stated that the fund continually encourages the establishment of economically useful projects in the northern and southwestern areas, and in the small towns outside the 3 main cities of Riyadh, Jiddah, and Dammam.

The report mentioned that loans have been granted for 65 industrial projects in small and middle-sized towns, of which 25 projects are in the southern region and 6 are in the northern region. Financial commitments for these loans total more than 1 billion riyals.

Aid on the part of the fund to electrical power companies represents still another aspect of the development of the rural areas. It should be mentioned that the royal decree, on the basis of which the Saudi Industrial Development Fund was established in the month of Safar in the year 1394 A.H. [1974 A.D.], stipulated that the basic aim of the fund is to support industrial growth in the private sector of the kingdom by means of offering middle-term or long-term loans, or by means of offering consultant services.

9468

CSO: 4802

SAUDI ARABIA

NEED TO CREATE DOMESTIC CHANNELS FOR CAPITAL CITED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 4 Apr 80 pp 4, 81

[Article by Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Shubayli: "We Need New Channels for Domestic Investment of Capital"]

[Text] Economic circles these days are following the news of the rise in interest rates in foreign banks. They have begun to go up so fast that they defy imagination. This has encouraged many "financiers" to invest their capital abroad by having it transferred through local banks and investment and banking corporations to the financial markets of Bahrain, other Gulf countries, or Europe and America.

Even if it is true that yields of investments of this sort can be as high as 20 percent, this could still have a bad effect on domestic economic activity and on the availability of liquid assets. This is because there would be a return to the easiest method of investment, which is to deposit money in foreign banks at a comfortable and profitable interest rate which will yield more than profits from commerce and real estate.

The effects of this phenomenon have actually already begun to be reflected these days in the values of stocks in corporations. The values of Saudi banks stocks have gone down noticeably, while the values of stocks of corporations dealing with services have maintained a modest level.

If this trend is true and continues, it will have, in my estimation, numerous unfortunate implications. First of all, this will open the door to more involvement on the part of investors in areas which involve a lot of risk and which they will feel uneasy about because they violate sound Islamic principles of investment. Secondly, liquid assets are leaving the country. Thirdly, this may cause a slackening in many areas of domestic investment which have been active for many years.

I am confident that the consequences of this matter have been considered by the authorities who are responsible for our national economy. I urge them to create appropriate solutions to head off and prevent this phenomenon before it takes its total effect on the prosperous economic situation of a number

of fields of economic activity. Likewise, I hope that those who have academic economic expertise will participate in dealing with this phenomenon by studying it, analyzing it, and acquainting people with its dimensions and its implications.

The thing that has induced me to suggest this, in spite of my lack of expertise and specialization in economics, is the fact that I had decided to propose opening up additional channels, in the form of joint-stock companies, to absorb small capital in a way which would grant people the opportunity to invest their money in the service of our country's development on a sound investment basis. I had been particularly impressed by recent examples of success of such investments thanks to carefully planned coordination between the government and businessmen, as in the case of Saudi banks, maritime and mass transport corporations, cement corporations, hotel corporations, real estate corporations, etc. The success was apparent in the fact that small shareholders contributed more than ten times the amount that some of the corporations had decided was necessary for incorporation. This is a hopeful sign that there will be more response on the part of our citizens, and that they will shoulder their responsibility in lightening the burden of the government in keeping with the principles of our country's ideology and free economic system. The government's support for these ideas and its occasional participation through capital and membership of boards of directors have made us feel more at ease and more confident about the growth of the private sector and the stability of our economy. The popularity of the stock of these new joint-stock companies has helped to erase the bitter experience which people had as a result of the stumbling course taken by one such local corporation several years ago.

I believe that the way to maintain this enthusiasm on the part of our citizens, to steer them away from the distress of plunging into "usurious" investments, and to keep our capital within the boundaries of our country, is for the government and for businessmen to think about creating more opportunities and areas in which our citizens can participate and in which they can invest their money. I believe, for example, that it would be appropriate for the government to consider right now giving up part of its shares in the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation "(SABK)," especially as it has been fully organized, people and businessmen have gained a good understanding of it, and it has been able to start achieving its aims.

Apart from this, there are a number of other new fields, especially in the realm of services, which the government is actually thinking about creating. But the final notion about how they are to be administered and owned has not yet crystalized. If enterprises in these new fields take the form of joint-stock companies, they would help absorb small capital, lighten the administrative burden of government agencies, and create flexibility and growth potential for such services.

Finally, instead of depending on the government for everything, we would begin, thanks God, to see more effective activity on the part of our citizens and on the part of "sincere" national capital in the areas of services,

public utilities, and development. And we would begin to hear that the private sector is thinking about, or actually beginning to, carry out projects which people in the past used to expect the government and its agencies to implement. May God grant us success.

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CSO: 4802

MUNICIPAL PROJECTS, SERVICES IN CENTRAL ARABIA SURVEYED

Riyadh AL-RIYADH in Arabic 17 Mar 80 p 4

[Article by Sa'ud al-Musaybih: "Municipal Services and Utilities Projects in the Central Area"]

[Text] The idea of setting up [regional] departments for municipal and village affairs was a good one, which has proven its success by the very fact that there has been a steady increase in the work and activities of these [regional] departments. The department for municipal and village affairs in the central region has undertaken to offer a number of services to the cities and villages of the central area, in order to raise their standard of living and to check negative migration from the villages and small towns to the large cities.

The activities of the department of municipal and village affairs consist of technical guidance and supervision of projects which are being implemented in the cities and villages of the central area. The most important of these projects concern roads, buildings, street lighting, public facilities and expropriations. The projects also include preparation of various plans for village centers and model cities, studies of sites for various projects, and studies of environmental, social, and economic issues for the towns and villages.

AL-RIYADH had an interview with Ahmad 'Abdallah al-Mish'al, the director of the department of municipal and village affairs of the central region. He talked about the most important achievements of his department recently. He said that the most important achievements of his department in the realm of planning have been the implementation of a number of plans which were authorized in the year 1399 A.H. They totalled 162 plans of various types, including 2 guidance plans, 16 educational plans, 76 land survey plans, 40 new land reclamation plans, and 28 road construction plans.

The department also is participating in preparing guidance plans for the cities and villages of the region. This consists of preparation of reports concerning the present situation of the towns which require studies and planning relating to environmental, social and economic conditions. The

department also oversees the implementation of housing plans; helps in the preparation of surveys of towns and villages; and helps in choosing and surveying sites [for projects] in keeping with environmental considerations.

Concerning the technical jobs which the department has undertaken recently, Ahmad al-Mish'al said that the project for extending water services in al-Zilfi has been completed. He said that the total length of the network of water lines is 16,235 meters, and that 350 homes have been provided with running water. There is also the project of the new water line network for al-Ghat, involving the construction of a water tower and a ground-level water storage tank. The total length of the water line network is 24,330 meters, and the number of houses supplied with running water is 650. The project is still in the process of being carried out. God willing, it will be completed in the very near future. Also, there has taken place the delivery and installation of a number of water well pumps and diesel machines for a number of municipalities in the central area. The total cost was 1 million riyals. This is what is being done in the way of water projects.

As for the special projects concerning villages of the region, Ahmad al-Mish'al said that the department has undertaken temporary asphalt paving for the streets of the villages of al-Tuwaym, Juwayy, Ha'ir, the town of al-Artawiyah, al-Ghatghat, al-Shu'ayb, and the villages of al-Kharj. The department has also undertaken the construction of dams for protection from the dangers of floods in the town of Umm Nakhlah in al-Quway'iyah, the town of ('Anab), and the villages of Sadus, al-Artawiyah and al-'Ammariyah.

As for building construction which the department has achieved, he said that the buildings which have been finished are the municipality buildings in al-Majma'ah, Darma', Thadiq, Rawdat Sudayr, Jalajil, (Tumayr), al-Ghat, Marat, and Hawtat Banī Tamim. Those which are still under construction are the municipality buildings in al-Sulayyil, 'Afif, al-Hariq, and al-Hilwah.

As for marketplace facilities, he said that vegetable and meat markets in al-Hilwah, al-Sulayyil, Darma', Thadiq, (Tumayr) and Sharawrah have been completed. Also, marketplaces are being constructed in al-Hariq, Marat, Rawdat Sudayr and Jalajil. A slaughterhouse has been built in each of the following places: al-Hilwah, (Tumayr), al-Sulayyil, al-Dilam, Rawdat Sudayr, and Marat. Slaughterhouses are currently being constructed in Jalajil and Sharawrah. As for park construction, 2 parks with public toilets have been constructed in al-Quway'iyah, a park has been built in Shaqra', and one has been built in Jalajil. In al-Aflaj, a park is currently being constructed. As for public toilets, a public toilet has been built in al-Quway'iyah, Wadi al-Dawasir and in al-Ghatghat.

Concerning cemeteries, he said that the department is very concerned about putting enclosures around them out of respect for the dead. The department has already undertaken to supervise the laying out of cemeteries in a number of cities and villages in the central region, including cemeteries that were completed for 11 cities in the year 1399 A.H. There are cemeteries which are still under construction in a number of the area's ci' 'es.

Asked about what new plans the department has for the new year, Ahmad al-Mish'al answered that, at the beginning of the year 1400 A.H., the department assigned some street and road paving projects to national agencies. They include projects for laying permanent asphalt pavement in Shaqra', and providing street lighting and sidewalks for a number of streets in the same city. Likewise, there are 10 projects for temporary paving in each of the following places: Hawtat Bani Tamim, al-Aflaj, Darm', Marat, Hawdat Sudayr, Rawdat Sudayr, (Tumayr), al-Dilam, and the village of Na'jan. The cost of these projects totals more than 14 million riyals.

The public department for municipal and village affairs in the central region will propose 14 more projects, and this will take place, by the grace of God, within the next few weeks. They include 8 projects for permanent paving of streets, building sidewalks, and putting up street lighting in each of the following places: al-Zilfi, Hawtat Bani Tamim, al-Aflaj, al-Kharj, Hawdat Sudayr, Shaqra', al-Mazahimiyah, and Wadi al-Dawasir. In addition, there will be 6 projects for temporary paving in Huraymila', al-Sulayyil, Shaqra', 'Afif, Wadi al-Dawasir, and Hawtat Sudayr.

In the realms of public water supply and public facilities, al-Mish'al said that the operation, maintenance, and repair of the water works in al-Dawadimi and Sharawrah has been entrusted to 2 national firms under a contract amounting to more than 3 million riyals. He said that the project for the expansion of the water system in al-Dir'iyah has been assigned to a national firm under a contract amounting to 2,276,750 riyals.

He said that the department will undertake technical advisory studies concerning the development, improvement, and expansion of projects having to do with the supply of drinking water in the cities of the central region. In fact, the assignment to carry out a study for 7 cities has been given to a Saudi group of consultants, who will work together with a foreign group of consultants. The towns concerned are al-Dir'iyah, Thadiq, Hawtat Sudayr, al-Majma'ah, al-Ghat, al-Zilfi, and Rawdat Sudayr. He said that assigning similar study projects for 5 other towns, which are al-Dawadimi, Darma', Marat, al-Quway'iyah and al-Mazahimiyah is under consideration. Other studies will be proposed for the remaining towns of the central region, one by one, within the next few weeks, God willing. And there is also a project for the protection of drinking water wells from the danger of floods in Rawdat Sudayr. God willing, this project will soon be assigned to a firm.

There is also another very important project which will soon be assigned. It is an advisory study plus preliminary and final designing for rain water drainage and sewage in Shaqra'. As for future projects in the realm of planning, Ahmad al-Mish'al said that during the past three months of the year 1400 A.H., the department undertook to carry out 46 plans. They include road construction and educational plans in a number of towns and villages of the central region. He added that his department, under the guidance of the minister of municipal and village affairs, will work hard to raise the level of municipal services for the towns and villages of the region and to give them a good appearance.

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CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR NAMED TO USSR--24 May SUNA--The Soviet Government has consented to the nomination of Hassan El Amin El Bashir as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. [Text] [Khartoum SUDAN NEWS AGENCY BULLETIN in English 25 May 1980 p 2]

JAPAN AID--31 May, SUNA--The Government of Japan has consented to extend the period fixed for the implementation of its 500 million yen (Ls 1,076,000) aid until 31 December because materials to be imported against it were not completely delivered. These materials include fertilizers, herbicides and zinc phosphate for the Agriculture Ministry. [Text] [Khartoum SUDAN NEWS AGENCY BULLETIN in English 31 May 1980 p 5]

DANISH LOANS--2 June, SUNA--National Planning Minister Nasr al-Din Mustafa received at his office yesterday morning the Danish Charge d'Affaires here who conveyed to him his government's consent to extend to the Sudan a loan of 110 million Kroner, \$20 million. The loan will be invested to finance the first phase of the Third Power Project of the Blue Nile national electricity network. The first phase includes Dongola, Shendi, al-Fashir and Wau. [Text] [Khartoum SUDAN NEWS AGENCY BULLETIN in English 2 Jun 80 pp 1-2]

CSO: 4820

FRG PAPER INTERVIEWS MINISTER ON MIDEAST ISSUE

DW271128 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 24, 25, 26 May 80 p 8

[Interview with Syrian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Faraq al-Shar' by unidentified reporter, date and place of interview not given]

[Text] SZ: Has a date been set already for the planned meeting between foreign ministers Genscher and Khaddam?

ANSWER: As far as I know no date has been agreed on so far.

SZ: What are the main problems in the relations between Syria and the Federal Republic?

ANSWER: They are improving in the field of trade and economy. The total import-export volume increases 33 percent on average each year. In the political field the attitude of the Federal Republic toward the rights of Palestinians, in contrast, is still very careful, it has remained devoid of any tangible progress in the past 2 years.

SZ: What role can the European countries play in the solution of the Middle East conflict?

ANSWER: We do not expect any important role on the part of the European countries in solving the Middle East conflict as long as the Europeans take over the U.S. definition of their security problems. On the one hand, Europe's military security is based on the nuclear umbrella of the United States. On the other hand, Europe's economic security is nearly devoid of any basis, to a certain degree this contains a contradiction since the United States is the only real competitor of the Europeans. Therefore, I am one of those who believes that a time will come in which we will experience a Euro-Soviet initiative in the Middle East if the Americans continue to be held hostage by the Israelis. Who would have ever thought of an alliance between the Soviets and the Western democracies against the nazis prior to World II?

SZ: What was the position you took at the Islamic conference in Islamabad on the Afghanistan issue?

ANSWER: Syria was represented at the Islamabad conference by a deputy foreign minister. Our position at the conference was clear. We support the nonalignment of Afghanistan against any imperialist threat. We cannot make common cause with the Americans who are siding with our enemies.

SZ: In Afghanistan the Soviet Union is attacking an Islamic country. Are you concerned about this?

ANSWER: As I said, it is our main objective to liberate our occupied territories and to insure the national rights of the Palestinians as recognized in the UN resolutions. Today no danger is greater than the threat to the Arab and Islamic countries by Israel, regardless of how you look at things on the surface.

SZ: How would you define your relations with the Soviet Union?

ANSWER: Good and constructive. The alliance of the Israelis and Americans against the national interests of the Arabs will make them even stronger.

CSO: 4403

CUSTOMS, TAX REFORMS, PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC SECTOR REVIEWED

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 11 Mar 80 p 6

[Interview with Finance Minister Hamdi Al-Saqqa in Damascus, date not given]

[Excerpts] The statement of Dr al-Kassab's government is the executive translation of the 16-day responsible and democratic discussions of the country's Seventh Party Congress. However, the appropriate ministries will play a major role in providing detailed explanation of the general and comprehensive directives of the statement through executive regulations and daily follow-up on their progress and implementation.

In this context, TISHRIN conducted an interview with Minister of Finance Hamdi al-Saqqa which dealt with realistic aspirations. The interview dwelt upon those matters which can be actually accomplished, even if this required radical changes in a number of administrative structures or realistic legislative measures which call for specific changes on specific dates and do not boil down to hopes and promises.

Gradual Reform of Customs Department

The minister said that his ministry is at present preparing studies and methods on restructuring the general human and organizational framework of the customs department in a manner which will enable it to gradually attain the purpose for which it was created. He said, "As finance minister, I will equip the customs with all human and financial means to control the borders in the first place." In this regard, the following will be done:

1. Agencies of the Customs Department will be modernized and their internal regulations will be coordinated. This will include standardizing exemption rules on gifts, grants and donations; amending customs settlements manual; defining the rules on the exemption of personal luggage and home furniture; continuing the preparation of rules on permits for [the free passage of] goods that belong to the various ministries, departments, agencies and public sector institutions and corporations;

reorganizing many border stations and control posts; and modernizing customs administrative police powers in a manner which will secure close control of the country's vast borders, help eliminate smuggling, and protect the rights of informers or other interested parties so as to encourage them to help fight smuggling.

2. The necessary instructions and executive orders will be issued to increase retiree pensions and allowances as authorized by Legislative Act No 3 of 1980 and its amendments.

3. The provisions of the Legislative Act No 167 of 1963 will be reconsidered and appropriate revisions will be drafted.

4. The uniform draft law on workers [in the government and public sector] will be reconsidered.

Tax Reform

With regard to tax reform, the minister said, "Current tax legislation includes out-of-date provisions which need to be reconsidered and new provisions which have been interpreted incorrectly, to the extent that taxation has become a means of raising money rather than a means of achieving social justice. In other words, tax policy should make those with unlimited income bear the inequities borne by workers with limited wages." The minister affirmed that fundamental tax reform followed in most advanced countries is based on imposing tax on total income of the individual, not what is formally declared; that there are old taxes in Syria, such as cattle taxes, whose cost of collection is higher than their proceeds; that there are studies to revise regulations on financial stamp fees to rid them of out-of-date complications; and that there is an intention to reconsider soon the tax system on television sets.

The ministry will seek to impose the income tax on the basis of actual profits, not on estimates as it is now. In this connection, the ministry will specifically endeavor to improve and modernize the imposition of the income tax burden on the following basis:

a. Continue the general classification of [passive] income taxpayers in the country according to a studied approach and practical steps in order to achieve justice in distributing the burden of this important tax.

b. Carry out the plan to eliminate the income tax backlog relating to [adjustment of declared estimated income to] actual income, and continue implementation of the plan through the appropriate committees established for this purpose.

c. Implement measures to modernize and simplify work methods and improve performance within the various financial agencies to make things easier for the citizen, chiefly through:

(i) Using computers in Damascus in the determination and collection of certain taxes.

(ii) Improving the criteria for granting clearances from tax liability in accordance with provisions of the law.

(iii) Establishing new rules for applying the law on corporate fees (imposed on estimated cash resources) and the law on fees imposed on gifts.

(iv) Establishing new regulations on verifying taxes on income to determine the fixed tax such as from fixed sources, such as the tax on real estate profits and the tax on [passive] income.

With regard to studies on financial reform:

1. The ministry submitted a complete integrated taxation plan for the country through a specialized committee which included representatives of all sectors. The committee presented its recommendations and suggestions on the subject, in a report which was submitted to the council of ministers with transmittal letter no 639 1/8 dated 1 September 1979.

2. The ministry continued its general and detailed studies on modernization of state budget operations, the general accounting office and the central treasury. The ministry started organizing its operations through the use of modern technology (electronic computers) in a way that permits systematic and periodic follow up on the budgetary situation.

3. The ministry approved the major principles of financial planning relating to preparation of the state budget and submitted the draft budget for 1980.

4. The ministry is reviewing and modernizing rules governing contracts of the administrative and economic sectors and settlements and reconciliations involving government agencies or public corporations and institutions.

5. The ministry is improving work performance within the agency for social security and pensions through the introduction of modern technology computation of (electronic computers) for the retirement pensions.

6. The ministry is reorganizing the public debt administration and has implemented administrative reforms within the office of the budget.

Compensation of Government Workers

Minister al-Saqqa added: "Financial compensation did not have uniform ground rules and suffered from a measure of confusion or inequity between various groups. For instance, what is the compensation of marketing personnel who are the backbone of the industrial public sector? The ministry is currently working on uniform compensation for administrative and productive personnel in the public sector."

Decree No 167

Minister al-Saqqa added: "Based upon that, the ministry prepared a bill to amend decree no 167 of 1963 and presented it to the Supreme Economic Committee. The bill has now been passed on to the council of ministers for ratification."

Job Classifications

Dr Al-Saqqa said, "we are about to establish job classifications for all the workers in the public sector."

Cost Accounting

At this point, the minister recalled the creation of the public industrial sector in the country at the dawn of the 8 March 1963 Revolution. He emphasized that ever since it was started, this important sector did not have the benefit of cost accounting systems, and that it recently became evident that economic returns of this sector are much lower than what is expected from it. Therefore, under the slogan of optimum utilization of our industrial and productive projects, the accounting department of the College of Commerce is signing contracts with the various institutions of the public sector to apply cost accounting methods as part of studied scientific programs which will assure high returns from these projects in the future.

Final Note

A ministerial committee on wages and prices was formed according to decision no 35 dated 9 February 1980. Its chairman is the deputy prime minister for economic affairs and its members are the ministers of finance, supply, planning and economy. The committee is responsible for a continuous study of any imbalance between price and income averages. The committee held its first meeting on the date of the decision creating it. It decided on a working plan which starts with the formation of a special technical committee whose function is to propose a structure for an index of prices and incomes.

At the conclusion of the interview, the Finance Minister emphasized that an increase in the returns of public sector organizations will inevitably

lead to improvement of the gross national product. Consequently, it will strengthen the purchasing power of the Syrian pound, and will prevent gains of the masses in terms of salary and wage increases from being diluted or made totally ineffective.

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INDUSTRY MINISTER REVIEWS PUBLIC, PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 10 Mar 80 p 6

[Interview with Industry Minister Husayn Al-Qadi, in Damascus]

[Text] Industry minister reviews accomplishments of 8 March revolution. The revolution provided 10,527 million Syrian pounds to the industrial sector over a period of ten years. Tens of factories and workshops dot the face of the provinces. We will not keep incompetent managers at the head of productive units. The appointment of a manager will be an economic decision, not a mere political one.

The 8 March revolution paid special attention to the industrial sector in order to establish an industrial base that contributes to the economic and social development of the country. Many changes took place in the economic and social fields over the past 17 years of the revolution. These changes are positively reflected in the standard of living of the people.

Tishrin interviewed Dr Husayn Al-Qadi, the industry minister, who talked about the main achievements of the revolution during this phase of its life, and their impact on the present situation. Here is the text of the interview:

[Question] What are the major accomplishments of the 8 March revolution in the industrial sector? And what is its role in supporting the public sector?

[Answer] The state, following the March revolution, paid special attention to the industrial sector. This took the form of nationalization of the large industrial corporations and enterprises so as to form the main industrial base for future industrial development. In 1964-65, attention centered on reorganizing management of the nationalized companies. For this

purpose, the Agency for the Public Industrial Sector was created in 1964. This was followed by the establishment of 3 trade federations in 1967. They are:

--The General Federation of Textile Industries.

--The General Federation of Engineering and Chemical Industries.

--The General Federation of Food Industries.

During the second five year plan for the years 1966-1970, the revolution aimed at supporting the nationalized enterprises and established new industrial units such as:

1. Completion of the construction of the azotic fertilizer plant in Homs.
2. Construction of an iron rod factory in Hama with a capacity of 120,000 tons a year.
3. Construction of a fine textile factory in Hama.
4. Construction of a tractors and agricultural machines factory in Aleppo.

In addition, other plants were built and nationalized industries were modernized and developed.

The third five year plan for the years 1971-1975 was aimed at achieving great improvement in industry, as 1,322 million Syrian pounds were allocated for this purpose. Using 1970 as a base year, an actual increase in industrial output of 178 percent has been achieved. The most important industrial projects carried out during that plan are:

--Expansion and modernization of a number of textile companies.

--Establishment of woolen carpet factories in Damascus and Aleppo.

--A batteries and liquid gas plant.

--Development of al-Nasr television company.

--Establishment of a plant for lead pencils.

--Establishment of a plant in Latakia for generators.

--The starting of two cement plants in Hama and Aleppo.

--A plant for medical equipment in Hama.

The fourth five-year plan for the years 1976-1980 aimed at achieving coordination and integration of the agricultural and industrial sectors; securing the availability of fertilizers and tractors for agriculture; creating industries based on agricultural products; doing without importing certain import items; helping to change the structure of industrial exports; and launching modernization of industrial management through the establishment of scientific centers and specialized study centers.

The plan allocated to the industrial sector a sum of 9205 million Syrian pounds out of a total of 39 billion Syrian pounds for all investments. This means that 25 percent of the total investments was allocated to industry.

The projects included in this plan are incomplete projects carried over from the third five-year plan (these projects started in the last three years of the third plan), and a number of new projects. The most important projects carried out during the current period are establishing the following:

- A woolen carpet plant at al-Suwayda.
- A ready-made clothes factory in Damascus and Aleppo.
- A textile unit in Latakia.
- Textile factories at Jablah, Dayr al-Zawr, Idlib and Homs.
- A beer factory at Damascus.
- A macaroni factory at Durah (phonetic)
- Four sugar factories at Al-Raqqah, Hasakah, (Salhab) and Dayr al-Zawr.
- A scrap metal melting factory at Hama and a metal pipes factory in Hama.
- An aluminum (frame) factory in Latakia.
- A batteries factory in Aleppo.
- Two glass factories in Aleppo.
- A cables factory in Aleppo.
- Tanning factories in Aleppo and Damascus.
- A tires factory in Hama.
- Four leather shoe factories in Hama.

With regard to the cement industry, the following were established:

- A cement factory at Adhra.
- A second reinforced cement factory in Aleppo.
- A cement factory at al-Shaykh Sa'id Quarter in Aleppo.
- A cement factory in Tartus.

Further achievements were establishment of the following:

- An amonia fertilizer plant in Homs.
- A phosphate fertilizer plant in Homs.
- A paper plant at Dayr al-Zawr.

During this period a series of legislative measures and regulations have been passed to modernize the management of these projects with a view to increasing their economic yield and improving performance in general.

[Question] How did the ministry of industry achieve what was mentioned in the National Action Program, the statement of the National Progressive Front, the resolutions of the Seventh National Congress of the [Ba'th] party, and the ministerial statement on the need for using the private industrial sector to support the public sector?

[Answer] The ministry of industry paid special attention to the implementation of the National Action Program, the statement of the National Progressive Front, and the resolutions of the National Congress of the [Ba'th] party on encouraging the private sector to complement the role of the public sector in achieving the desired economic development. The most important practical measures taken in this connection are:

1. Issuing directives to industry managers in the governorate to expedite granting industrial permits to the private sector and to avoid routine complications and red tape.
2. Exempting many small industries from the licensing procedures and considering them as crafts.
3. Issuing a decision which defines the areas of specialization of the public sector and leaves many other activities for the national private capital to invest in.
4. Transferring many industrial [Syrian] enterprises from Lebanon because of the recent events there. Also, transferring many Syrian enterprises outside Syria to Syria in order to carry out state policy of encouraging the return of the national capital to the country.

5. Extending a series of facilitating measures to promote the private industrial sector, such as securing needed raw material from the public sector and issuing industrial license plates for many cars that serve the private sector.
6. Conducting a detailed study for establishing industrial compounds where basic facilities, such as roads, electricity and telephone service are available in order to encourage national capitalists to establish their businesses and spare them many difficulties.
7. Conducting studies aimed at determining industrial areas in all cities in order to contribute to the promotion of the industrial private sector.

[Question] The emphasis has been on the importance of establishing a joint sector of both public and private sectors. How do you conceive the method and what are the practical steps toward achieving this goal?

[Answer] The country has experience in the field of joint ventures. The establishment of the Euphrate Tractors Company jointly with the Epiro Company of Spain in Aleppo is a primary example of this. The project was intended to benefit from foreign experience and technology. The company now assembles the tractor (Euphrate). Initially, 20 percent of the tractor parts were manufactured locally. The figure is 40 percent at the present time. It is hoped that the future will witness an increase in parts manufacturing locally to 80 percent.

A Syrian-Spanish Company has been established for the production of electronic telephone equipment. It started to take executive steps recently.

A Syrian-Jordanian Company started with joint capital to carry out a number of industrial projects such as a white cement factory project, a project for the production of cement factory equipment (such as steel grinders), and an insecticides factory project.

In 1979, the Arab Industrial Investment Company was established in Baghdad. Syria participated with capital enough to qualify her for a seat on the board of directors. This company will be responsible for establishing engineering and electrical projects.

In 1978, the Syrian-Libyan Investment Company was announced. Syria's share of the capital was 50 percent. The company was entrusted with establishing a Syrian textile factory and with a project to increase wheat germ.

At the present time, the ministry is studying expansion of the joint sector with foreign companies on definite conditions which are geared to the transfer of modern technology to the country as a part of the country's economic and social policy. This is in addition to having the private

sector or domestic capital participate in the public or joint sectors. We believe that there is a lot of money held by the private sector which can be utilized.

[Question] The party decisions emphasized the importance of correcting the existing deficiencies in the companies and paying special attention to the selection of their managers from among those who are capable and experienced. Can you give us an idea about your concept of the manner of carrying out these decisions? Did you start executing them? And how?

[Answer] The ministry pays great attention to developing the work performance in the ministry of industry and its subsidiary enterprises and companies. There is something wrong with the structure which hindered many departments from carrying out their responsibilities. We are working on changing the structure on a scientific basis so that the ministry can play its role of leading the industrial development of the country.

The Ministry aims at attracting the best qualified and experienced personnel, simply because it pays special attention to operating the industrial projects economically in order to increase their productivity, raise the quality of products and reduce the waste of raw material.

We will not leave incompetent managers at the top of these productive units. Management is a science that has its principles, and the manager should be familiar with these principles. We have to realize that appointing the manager is an economic decision not a political one.

Actually, we suffer from having in a number of companies administrative cadres who do not possess scientific qualifications. These cadres pursued bureaucratic routine in order to cover up their failure.

In order to improve the public sector, we should reconsider the administrative cadres, evaluate them on a clear scientific basis, and introduce new elements which possess scientific qualifications and integrity. This in addition to increasing decentralization and granting more authority to managers while holding them accountable for production.

Wages in the public sector represent 25-30 percent of the total cost of production. Following issuance of the decree to increase wages and salaries, production cost is expected to rise by 15 percent of the previous total cost.

[Question] What are your plans to absorb this increase without adding it to the prices of products? Are there any practical rather than theoretical suggestions to be implemented in this connection?

[Answer] Production costs will increase at the same old rates if the production formula stays as it was before the salary and wage increase. However, we are pursuing different courses of action, such as:

1. Operating at full capacity (3 shifts) whenever it is possible technically. This is what happened in the textile sector and other sectors too. Operating this way reduces the ratio of fixed costs, such as depreciation of machines, and administrative costs which are added to the unit costs. This will lead to absorbing the increase resulting from the salaries increase and will keep unit costs down.
2. Operating the production lines which were not operated due to lack of workers.
3. Reducing production costs through elimination of waste of raw material, and motivating the workers by giving them a share of the savings from controlling the industrial costs.
4. Reducing production costs through reduction of the number of workers and transfer of the surplus to other production lines in other companies or to new companies.
5. Paying attention to [wholesale] purchasing of the materials needed by all companies. Study of storage methods and issuance of materials as part of a programmed plan that saves the costs of damage inherent in excessive storage and obsolescence resulting from changes in material specifications.
6. Improving product quality by establishing standards and quality control for products and materials in all industrial companies.
7. Improving sales and export methods through modernization of commercial operations, granting the needed flexibility to marketing factors, expanding participation in international fairs and exhibitions, opening new markets for national products, continuing studies of productivity in all enterprises in a way that leads to an increased rate of modernization and a reduced unit of production cost.

We should not forget to mention that the increase of salaries and wages was meant to retain the most precious wealth we own, namely manpower which was leaving for other countries.

[Question] It is known that most of our industrial enterprises suffer from financial deficits and liquidity problems. This may increase as a result of salary and wage increases. What are the practical measures to correct the situation with regard to the financial deficits and liquidity problems?

[Answer] The ministry had set up a technical committee that includes university professors to study financial conditions in industrial enterprises and evaluate the needs for liquid assets to finance working capital and secure its needs. This committee completed its mission and defined the funds needed to support liquidity in all industrial companies. This is being reviewed by the ministry as a prelude to carrying out actual funding

of these enterprises. We believe that the financial difficulties of all our industrial companies will be dealt with shortly.

We believe that this problem is not difficult to solve, because it resulted from establishing some enterprises without securing capital for them. These enterprises depended heavily on loans from the public debt fund. However, funds are allocated in the new budget in order to solve this problem.

Table 2. Projects Approved for the Private Sector for 1974-1978

Value in thousands

Type of Industry	Statement	1974	%	1975	%	1976	%	1977	%	1978	%	Total
Engineering	1. Capital	41093	-	51904	142	95535	159	48060	58	88800	184	333392
	2. Projects	495	100	605	122	1250	206	1602	128	1777	111	5729
	3. Workers	1776	-	7100	118	4000	190	4806	120	3200	66	15882
Chemical	1. Capital	33810	-	45029	133	63518	141	58358	91	69654	119	270369
	2. Projects	209	-	128	61	217	169	200	92	131	65	885
	3. Workers	1047	-	697	66	1122	70	736	66	827	112	4429
Food	1. Capital	21698	-	3955	18	19827	50	20747	104	14030	67	80257
	2. Projects	159	-	158	99	87	55	51	59	76	149	531
	3. Workers	811	-	850	105	591	110	287	49	124	43	2663
Textile	1. Capital	55735	-	81304	145	76583	94	65075	84	27260	41	305957
	2. Projects	286	-	368	129	536	146	643	120	209	32	2042
	3. Workers	1269	-	1374	108	1881	86	1662	88	553	33	6739
Total	1. Capital	152336	-	190192	124	255463	134	192240	75	190744	103	989975
	2. Projects	1149	-	1259	91	2090	166	2496	119	2193	88	9187
	3. Workers	4903	-	5021	106	7594	154	7491	99	4704	63	29713

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AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER GOODS ANNOUNCED IN AL-RAQQAH

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 29 Feb 80 p 3

[Excerpt] The executive bureau of the local administration in al-Raqqah approved meat prices set by the Committee for the Determination of Prices in the province as follows:

1. Lamb Meat:

Lean meat, 25 Syrian pounds per kg

Meat with 25 percent fat, 23 Syrian pounds per kg

Ground Meat with 50 percent fat, 22 Syrian pounds per kg

Fat, 16 Syrian pounds per kg

2. Goat Meat:

Lean meat, 20 Syrian pounds per kg

Meat with 25 percent fat, 18 Syrian pounds per kg

Ground Meat with 50 percent fat, 16 Syrian pounds per kg

3. Veal Meat:

Lean meat, 19 Syrian pounds per kg

Meat with 25 percent fat, 17 Syrian pounds per kg

Ground Meat with 50 percent fat, 16 Syrian pounds per kg

4. Beef Meat:

Lean meat, 18 Syrian pounds per kg

Meat with 25 percent fat, 16 Syrian pounds per kg

Ground Meat with 50 percent fat, 15 Syrian pounds per kg

5. Camel Meat:

Lean meat, 15 Syrian pounds per kg

Meat with 25 percent fat, 13 Syrian pounds per kg

Ground Meat with 50 percent fat, 11 Syrian pounds per kg

The prices of eggs were set as follows:

An egg that weighs 51 g, 35 piastres

An egg that weighs 57 g, 37.5 piastres

An egg that weighs over 58 g, 40 piastres

The director of the al-Raqqah branch of the Public Retail Company stated that the branch has put on the market quantities of rationed consumer items in both rural and urban areas. The quantity of sugar placed on the market has reached 600 tons; rice, 200 tons. These quantities will cover 50 percent of the amounts needed to satisfy ration cards for February and March. In addition, fifty tons of cotton seed oil, which cover 40 percent of the amount needed to satisfy the needs of ration cards, have also been put on the market.

The branch director said that in accordance with the ministry of supply's decree no 67, the branch will place additional quantities of the above-mentioned commodities on the market to meet the needs of citizens' ration cards for February and March.

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BRIEFS

ALEPPO ECONOMIC SITUATION--Aleppo, SANA--Yesterday, Minister of Supply and Internal Trade Muhammad Ghabbash chaired a meeting attended by members of the supply community and representatives of consumer cooperatives, storage and refrigeration enterprises, and automatic bakeries. The availability of all food and supply commodities on the market of the province was confirmed. The directors of the consumer agency and the retail company confirmed the availability of all goods in stores and warehouses to meet the needs of the citizens. Following the meeting, the minister of supply and internal trade, accompanied by directors of supply agencies made an inspection tour of warehouses, sales outlets and produce markets of the Retail Company. They acquainted themselves with the company's operations and its functions in serving the citizens and meeting their needs. On the other hand, Dr Muhammad al-Atrash, minister of economy and foreign trade paid inspection visits yesterday to the Economy Department and to the Cotton Ginning and Marketing Corporation. He met with officials of the corporation and familiarized himself with its work and its fulfillment of its functions. [Text] [Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 3 Mar 80 p 2]

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CSO: 4802

AHMED MESTIRI SEEN AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR TO BOURGUIBA

Paris REMARQUES ARABO-AFRICAINES in French Apr-May 80 pp 41-43

[Article by Jacques Burlion: "Ahmed Mestiri, the Man of Tomorrow?"]

[Text] A possible successor to Bourguiba? In any case, he is one of the outstanding personalities of today's Tunisia. Jacques Burlion knew him well and tells us what he thinks of this indefatigable fighter.

A small, bare office on the second floor of a featureless house on a calm street 3 km from the center of Tunis: every day a little bespectacled man comes there. He dresses quite conservatively, wearing a gray suit, tie, and a smile.

Ahmed Mestiri is a lawyer. His office is not far away, and his business is prospering. He has been minister of Internal Affairs and, in turn, the head of State Minister Mongi Slim's cabinet, state secretary for Justice, state secretary for Finance and Commerce, ambassador to Moscow, Cairo, and Algiers, and state secretary for Defense.

A Flair for Political Infighting

What makes him run? He is 55 years old, scion of a bourgeois family noted in La Marsa, the patrician quarter of the chic Tunisian suburb. Maybe his innate flair for political infighting, his conviction that Bourguibism will eventually run its course and his confidence in the future of his own way of thinking.

Jacques Leblond wrote in the French daily LE FIGARO less than a year ago, "Maybe under the delicately sculptured stucco of the Carthage palace where 19 beys preceded Bourguiba, he is faking Volpone's death throes the better to abuse his inheritors' impatience. Didn't he have himself hospitalized four times in foreign clinics at critical periods in his reign? If that is the case, he succeeded in getting out of the way some of the supposed candidates to succeed him: Mohammed Ben Salah, Ahmed Mestiri and his group...."

He got rid of Ahmed Mestiri? True, already in 1968 this young lawyer who was then state secretary for Defense had deliberately broken with the party in power (in his secretaryship as well as in his capacities at the political bureau of the Destourian Socialist Party) to protest the "bad functioning of the wheels of government and frantic collectivization in all economic areas without enabling legislation." He was immediately excluded from the party and refrained from running in the October 1969 elections. He was back in the party in April 1970 and emphasized to the Central Committee on the eve of Ben Salah's trial that Ben Salah was not the only one responsible for the consequences of his policy....

On 23 June 1971, Ahmed Mestiri submitted his resignation to President Bourguiba as minister of Internal Affairs, and Habib Boulares turned in his portfolio as minister of Information. Yet both of them belonged to the liberal wing of the party--it had hitherto been in the majority among cabinet officers--that took its cue from the head of state's speech of 8 June [1971], in which the "supreme combatant" inaugurated a new era in Tunisia's history.

The Day of Knowledge

A few days later, Ahmed Mestiri chaired the "Day of Knowledge" before a group of graduates, parents, and party members.

"President Bourguiba," he said, "has given us a responsibility that we shall do our best to accept. Thank goodness everything is doing all right. But when the situation was beginning to clear up, the harvest turned out good, and the government was busy analyzing the consequences of collectivism to prepare a recovery plan in the areas of agriculture, the economy, and education, and we were striving to find solutions adequate to the vital problems our future depends on, and at this very moment, a group of men who were not satisfied with this progress set about to poison the atmosphere when President Bourguiba's speech of 8 June 1970 [as published] had made a turning point in this country's history...."

Ahmed Mestiri thus confirmed the conflict between the "liberal" group and some political personages.

He added, "These people must be unmasked, and the people must be told about those who serve them and those who are maneuvering shamefully. As for us, we have done our duty to insure the regime's stability. Our conscience is at peace."

Separating the Wheat from the Tares

At that time Ahmed Mestiri could not be suspected of wishing to undercut the head of state. He also said, "No one must be able to exploit youth's generosity and impulsiveness for ambiguous ends," implicitly stigmatizing Tahar Belkhodja, minister of Youth and Sports, whom he reproached for having decreed without due consideration that students would be admitted free to stadiums, which made them open to rowdiness.

He continued, "They've said I am against the president! Yet my admiration for him is not new today; it dates from when I was 14 and politically active, despite my particular family connections, which are well known." (Ahmed Mestiri's uncle was one of the leading personalities of the old Destour--a traditionalist branch of the Destour party schism--and obviously hostile to his young nephew's options.)

"Those who accuse us of plotting are the real plotters. The people should know about that so they can separate the wheat from the tares.... Thank God the president is now aware of all these acts of sabotage. That is why we retain unshakable confidence in him."

Dignity First

On 21 January 1972 Ahmed Mestiri was expelled from the Destourian Socialist Party for a second time. Serious charges were made against him by the political bureau, which was chaired by President Bourguiba, charges that stemmed from the report of the disciplinary commission formed to rule on his case. The bureau's communique mentions notably that the former minister "still maintains" the statements he made to the foreign press after the party congress, when he said that after his and his friends' "victory" it was obvious what conclusions were to be drawn from the meeting, and he strongly criticized Prime Minister Hedi Nouira. The political bureau's communique stated that Mestiri's comments had been made "for the purpose of deception" and were the opposite of the truth....

As a result, Ahmed Mestiri was accused of "(1) dereliction of duty, (2) deviating from the party's principles and its political line, and (3) actions threatening the very existence of the party, strengthening its enemies' position, and harming its interests and prestige."

The former minister had appeared twice before the disciplinary commission. According to his entourage, he refused to take part in a third meeting and rejected a draft declaration offered to him in which he would have recanted all his previous remarks, recognized that he had been wrong in saying certain things, proclaimed his loyalty to President Bourguiba and the party, his devotion to the political bureau and his esteem for Mr Hedi Nouira's government. From then on, it seemed inevitable that a severe sanction would be taken against him, especially since 10 days earlier, after President Bourguiba had said Mestiri might return to the party when he had "returned to better feelings," Ahmed Mestiri answered in the foreign press: "My return cannot take place under conditions contrary to my dignity, my convictions, and the principles proclaimed by the Monastir congress...."

Multiple Parties: Sugar Coating?

Since 1972 Ahmed Mestiri has opposed the policy of Hedi Nouira, whom President Bourguiba anointed as his successor. "Mr Nouira is meeting the double responsibility of prime minister and general secretary of the party with such high competence that I look to the future with confidence and serenity. I am happy to take this occasion to pay him homage for the colossal work that he is doing

and I call on all men of good will to support him in his efforts."

Thus spake Habib Bourguiba at the opening of the 10th Destourian Socialist Party congress.

Meanwhile, several events had shaken the regime. The union crisis had broken out in 1977, and there had been riots in January 1978.

Hedi Nouira was especially caustic to his declared opponents. He first set about to reject categorically the installation of multiple parties: "a sugar coating masking the lack of a model for an ideal society or government program."

He showered his opponents with slashing criticism: "mentally unemployed," "irresponsible politicians," "congenitally bitter," "envious people who chase after power the way a cat chases its own tail," etc.

But the prime minister reserved his sharpest arrows for the Movement of Democratic Socialists, headed by Ahmed Mestiri. It should be mentioned that in October 1977 the opposition led by Mr Mestiri had proposed to the president of the Republic a draft National Pact that would guarantee "under the constitutional legality represented by Bourguiba" the exercise of fundamental liberties and free and open choice to all the political tendencies in the country....

This plan received no answer from the government. At the 10th Destourian Socialist Party congress, Hedi Nouira dismissed the case: "This opposition has no program, no definite objectives, no notion of correct and reasonable evaluation, and has taken refuge in general opposition even as it seeks sponsorship and support from abroad...."

On the evening of 5 September 1979 Ahmed Mestiri told reporters, "As much as President Bourguiba's speech has raised the level of debate by setting forth a conception of government that is close to our own, Mr Nouira has engaged in low polemics and narrow sectarianism. Today Bourguiba opened a door that Nouira hurried to close...."

An Unfindable Newspaper

The legislative elections were to take place on 4 November 1979. Midway between the 10th congress, which had confirmed his banishment, and the elections Ahmed Mestiri let it be known that the opposition would refuse to take part in the election. His request to constitute the Movement of Democratic Socialists had been a dead letter for 15 months, and the former minister wrote in his weekly DEMOCRATIE, "As long as political parties are not authorized in Tunisia, no normal election can take place.... When you consider what happened in the election of Central Committee members at the 10th congress among the Destourian leaders themselves, when you consider how low the word 'elections' has fallen in public opinion, do we have the right to take part in this 'operation'? Wouldn't it supply arguments for and strengthen authoritarianism and, more serious yet, block the way to democratization?"

DEMOCRATIE (in Arabic, "Er-Rai") is the organ of the MSD [Movement of Democratic Socialists] and sometimes gives a voice to other opposition trends. It is sold on the newsstands of downtown Tunis. Elsewhere the paper cannot seem to be found. "Try to find it in the suburbs or the provinces, where the police can discreetly pressure the vendors.... In one year," Ahmed Mestiri adds, "we have had 11 trials, and the articles are not signed any more to avoid multiple prosecution."

The election did take place. Obviously they confirmed the purely Bourguibist line and the position of his prime minister.

Defending the Country

Not three months later, the Gafsa affair broke. Faced with danger apparently coming from Libya, Tunisia immediately put its domestic problems on the back burner. The sacred union still did not cause Ahmed Mestiri to lose clear sight of his ambitions: "Though Tunisians do not always agree on how to run the country," he said last February, "when it comes to defending it, a cohesion appears that gives clear expression to national feeling."

The MSD leader nonetheless thinks that this energy should be channeled into consolidating the home front and should not serve exclusively to strengthen the machinery of the sole party. "The consolidation of the home front should apply not only at the political level but also at the economic and social level. The potential causes of discontent should be removed, and we ought not to leave ourselves open to enemies of the regime who, at home and abroad, seek to exploit latent discontent...."

Last 8 March, when the prime minister seemed to have to give up all political activity because of ill health, the sole party made overtures to the MSD opposition. Ahmed Mestiri and seven other former officials who had gone over to the opposition were reinstated.

A Brilliant Future?

The decision is not lacking in ambiguity if you consider that the people involved were not consulted and that Ahmed Mestiri continues to ask that his opposition party be officially constituted.

The former successor to Habib Bourguiba nonetheless recognizes that "this gesture seems to spring from good intentions," but that "it does not fundamentally change the nature of the problems presently facing the country."

For Ahmed Mestiri, whom President Bourguiba had agreed to receive a few days before, it was important "to make a complete and sincere evaluation of the situation and proceed to make substantial, indispensable changes responding to the aspirations of the people and the imperatives of the future."

All the tribulations that Ahmed Mestiri has undergone in the eight years that have elapsed since his break with and separation from power have in no way weakened his political stature. At the age of 55, this bubbling lawyer still has a brilliant future ahead of him.

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